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“Evolution means nothing but growth in the widest sense of that word. 
Reproduction, of course, is merely one of the incidents of growth. And 
what is growth? Not mere increase. Spencer says it is the passage from 
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous—or, if we prefer English to 
Spencerese—diversification.”** 
“The fact is that complexity is self-potentiating. Complex systems gen-
erally engender further principles of order that produce yet greater 
complexities. Complex organisms create an impetus towards complex 
societies, complex machines towards complex industries, complex ar-
maments towards complex armies. And the world’s complexity means 
there is, now and always, more to reality than our science – or for that 
matter our speculation and our philosophy—is able to dream of.”*** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
odern international law seems to be in disarray. The classic doc-
trines of international law, with their focus on sovereignty, state 
consent, custom, and treaty, do not provide a satisfactory explanation for 
many of the practices and institutional structures that fill the global legal 
universe. The contemporary legal terrain seems to be characterized by 
overlapping jurisdictions, inconsistent doctrinal interpretations, and 
competing worldviews. But what are the social implications of the deep-
ening fragmentation and increasing complexity of the global legal sys-
tem? Some observers argue that these phenomena constitute a new global 
risk, which requires urgent collective response. Global constitutionaliza-
tion is put forward in this context as a possible and appropriate reaction.1 
                                                                                                             
   **  1 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 
§1.174 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds.) (1931). 
       *** NICHOLAS RESCHER, NATURE AND UNDERSTANDING: THE METAPHYSICS AND 
METHOD OF SCIENCE 25 (Clarendon Press) (2000). 
 1. This was the approach of two former Presidents of the International Court of Jus-
tice (“ICJ”), Judge Stephen M. Schwebel and Judge Gilbert Guillaume. Both expressed 
their concern regarding the proliferation of international judicial bodies and the increas-
ing fragmentation of the international legal order and suggested extending and reaffirm-
ing the powers and international status of the ICJ as a solution. See Judge Stephen M. 
Schwebel, President, ICJ, Address to the Plenary Session of the United Nations (Oct. 26, 
1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=133&pt=1&p1=6 
&p2=1 [hereinafter Schwebel Speech 1999]; Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President, ICJ, 
Address to the to the United Nations General Assembly, (Oct. 26 2000), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/9/3069.pdf [hereinafter Guillaume Speech 2000]. 
M 
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Using the notions of purity and paradox, this Article develops an ana-
lytic framework by which the increasing complexity of the international 
legal system can be elucidated. Drawing on this framework, the Article 
considers the consequences of the complexification of the global legal 
system in terms of its stability and legitimacy. Rather than seeing the 
messy and complex nature of modern international law as a risk, this Ar-
ticle depicts it as an evolutionary achievement that extends the horizon of 
possibilities through which the international legal system can react to 
social pressures. In this light, attempts to purify the international legal 
system by appealing to grand theories⎯constitutional, moral, or 
other⎯are ill-conceived for two reasons: first, because these grand theo-
ries fail to recognize the innate paradoxicality of the law; and second, 
because such theories constitute a threat to the legitimacy and resilience 
of the global legal system. This Article explores, in this context, alterna-
tive institutional models that draw upon⎯rather than oppose⎯the com-
plexity and paradoxicality of modern international law. 
This Article opens with Section I, a discussion of the Westphalian 
scheme of validity (what I will call “the purity thesis”). It then considers, 
in Section II, the invocation of the Westphalian scheme within new in-
ternational regimes such as the World Trade Organization and the Inter-
national Criminal Court and argues that the Westphalian scheme creates 
irresolvable paradoxes within these regimes. To facilitate this argument, 
this Article develops a model of paradoxicality in philosophy and law. 
Section III explores alternative forms of validation that claim to fill the 
normative void caused by the demise of the Westphalian model. On close 
inspection, these alternative forms of validation prove equally problem-
atic, lacking both coherence and completeness. Section IV takes a step 
back by looking into the history of international legal theory for the 
foundations of the Westphalian scheme of validity. This historical ex-
amination demonstrates that international law has never been pure. I 
show that this impurity closely parallels the problem of grounding in phi-
losophy, especially as reflected in the semantic paradox entitled “the 
Truth-Teller Paradox.” The last part of this section explores the role of 
paradoxes in the dynamic of autonomous and self-organizing systems 
(such as law). Given the impurity of international law historically, what 
then is unique about the current state of international law? This question 
is addressed in Section V, which argues that what is unique about the 
current system of international law is not the impurity of our forms of 
validation, but the proliferation of multiple, paradoxical validating tech-
niques that are invoked simultaneously at the forefront of the interna-
tional legal body. The contemporary universe of transnational law is 
characterized by a shift from (imaginary) purity to multiple paradoxical-
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ity—a process of polymorphosis. What are the practical consequences of 
this process? The remainder of this Article explores the sociological im-
plications of this process, drawing on ideas from systems theory and 
ecology. It concludes, in Section IV, with a discussion of the false prom-
ise of global constitutionalism, setting it against an alternative institu-
tional model: non-hierarchical reflexivity. 
I. PURITY: THE WESTPHALIAN NARRATIVE 
The pure conception of international law aspired to provide a complete 
and coherent account of the structure of international law. In particular, it 
argued that international law regulates⎯in a complete and coherent fash-
ion⎯the creation of new (international) norms.2 A succinct description 
of the Westphalian narrative can be found in an article published by Leo 
Gross in 1948: 
The Peace of Westphalia . . . marks the end of an epoch and the open-
ing of another. It represents the majestic portal which leads from the 
old into the new world. . . . In the political field it marked man’s aban-
donment of the idea of a hierarchical structure of society and his option 
for a new system characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity of 
states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one another, and free 
from any external earthly authority. The idea of an authority or organi-
zation above the sovereign states is no longer. . . . This new system 
rests on international law and the balance of power, a law operating be-
tween rather than above states and a power operating between rather 
than above states.3 
In the legal domain, the Westphalian narrative was translated into an 
articulated doctrine of validity and authority. This doctrine⎯in the form 
explicated here⎯constitutes what I call the pure vision of international 
law.4 One of the most eloquent advocates of the purity thesis was Josef 
                                                                                                             
 2. For a historical account of the development of the theory of international law, see 
generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 353–509 (Cambridge University Press 2002); 
Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 
(2006). 
 3. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 28–29 
(1948). The Westphalian narrative was discussed in numerous articles and books. See, 
e.g., Amos S. Hershey, History of International Law Since the Peace of Westphalia, 6 
AM. J. INT’L L. 30 (1912); Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and 
the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L ORG. 251 (2001) (citations omitted). 
 4. This vision can be associated, of course, with the positivist school, whose most 
obvious representative in the early twentieth century was Hans Kelsen. See Martti 
Koskenniemi, Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law, 8 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 215, 216–217 (1997); Jorg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of Inter-
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Kunz. Kunz argued that international law regulates the creation of inter-
national norms through two hierarchically ordered procedures: custom 
and treaty.5 Both are based on the notion of state consent. Custom, Kunz 
argued, is the hierarchically higher form of norm creation in international 
law. “Custom-produced, general international law is the basis; the cus-
tomary principle of ‘Pacta sunt servanda’ is the reason for the validity of 
all particular international law created by the treaty procedure.”6 Interna-
tional law also lays down the conditions under which the procedure of 
custom creates valid norms of general international law. These two con-
ditions are usage and opinio juris.7 Jus cogens norms, to the extent that 
they have not been codified in treaties, constitute another type of cus-
tomary law.8 This legal articulation of the Westphalian narrative seeks to 
provide a complete and coherent account of the way in which interna-
tional law regulates the creation of new norms. This account, although 
without explicit hierarchical order, also underlies Article 38 of the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice, which states that international 
disputes should be resolved primarily through the application of interna-
tional conventions and international custom.9 
                                                                                                             
national Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 523, 548 (2004). 
 5. Joseph L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 
662, 665 (1953) (“Treaty and custom are two different, independent procedures for creat-
ing international legal norms.”). 
 6. Id. The status of the norm pacta sunt servanda as a norm of general international 
law is probably beyond doubt. Kunz argues that it constitutes “the axiom, postulate and 
categorical imperative of the science of international law” and is “undoubtedly a positive 
norm of general international law.” Joseph L. Kunz, The Meaning and the Range of the 
Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 180, 180 (1945). Its status received further 
recognition in the text of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention] (the definitions of “ratification,” “acceptance,” “approval,” and “ac-
cession” all emphasize state consent). See also Paul Schiff Berman, From International 
Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 487 (2005). 
 7. Kunz, supra note 5, at 665. On the interpretation of these two conditions, see 
Kammerhofer, supra note 4, at 548. 
 8. See Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-party 
States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 57 (2001) (with respect to the prohibitions 
against genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). 
 9. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
33 U.N.T.S 993. It is also echoed in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, which states 
that “[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm 
of general international law,” thus reflecting the hierarchical order postulated by Kunz. 
Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art 53. Kunz, supra note 5, at 665. 
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II. PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE CURRENT INVOCATIONS 
OF THE WESTPHALIAN NARRATIVE 
In describing the demise of the Westphalian legal order, writers usually 
refer to processes of norm development in non-state arenas, the increas-
ing importance of non-state actors such as non-Governmental organiza-
tions (“NGO”) and multinational enterprises (“MNE”), the law-making 
powers of international tribunals, and the emergence of general princi-
ples of global humanitarian law.10 However, despite the ongoing talk 
about the demise of the Westphalian order, its underlying principles of 
state sovereignty and state consent continue to play an important role in 
the structure of various international legal regimes. It is interesting, 
therefore, to consider the way in which the Westphalian scheme of valid-
ity (as postulated by Joseph Kunz and Leo Gross) is invoked in contem-
porary treaty regimes. This Section explores this question in the context 
of two key treaty regimes: the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and 
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). I will argue that the invocation 
of the Westphalian validity doctrine in these regimes generates deep in-
consistencies that undermine its claim to provide coherent and complete 
foundations for modern international law. 
Exposing the paradoxes and inconsistencies associated with the West-
phalian doctrinal apparatus requires that I first elucidate the meaning of 
paradox in both logic and law. This theoretical detour also lays the 
groundwork for the broader thesis set forth in Sections IV and V of this 
Article. 
A. Detour: Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law 
1. Paradoxes: A General Exposition 
What do we mean by the concept of “paradox”? The term is sometimes 
used informally to designate a statement that conflicts with the common 
view.11 Within the realm of law, this understanding can be applied to any 
legal claim that challenges a received legal opinion. I am interested in 
other forms of paradoxes—not paradoxes that reflect a transitory inter-
                                                                                                             
 10. For a general discussion of the demise of the Westphalian paradigm, see Gunther 
Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW 
WITHOUT A STATE 3, 3–30 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); Berman, supra note 6, at 487–
88. 
 11. Thus, the definition of paradox in the Oxford Dictionary opens with: “Statement 
contrary to received opinion.” THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 
880 (5th ed. 1964). 
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pretative dispute but, rather, those that expose a deeper social and lin-
guistic problematic. 
Philosophical literature offers various definitions of this more chal-
lenging understanding of the concept of paradox. One view focuses on 
the deep inconsistency associated with paradoxes. Nicholas Rescher, for 
example, defines paradox as a “set of propositions that are individually 
plausible but collectively inconsistent.”12 Another view emphasises the 
paradox’s problematical conclusion, taking paradox as “an argument that 
begins with premises that appear to be clearly true, that proceeds accord-
ing to inference rules that appear to be valid, but that ends in contradic-
tion.”13 Other thinkers, such as W.V. Quine, have highlighted the reason-
ing pattern that generates the paradox: “[a]n antinomy produces a self-
contradiction by accepted ways of reasoning. It establishes that some 
tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and hence-
forward be avoided or revised.”14 In light of these general reflections, it 
is possible to distinguish between two major types of paradoxes.15 Para-
doxes of coherence expose a deep inconsistency in some well-defined set 
of sentences or propositions,16 while semantical paradoxes involve no-
tions of truth, falsity, and reference, and challenge the way we reason 
with these notions.17 
                                                                                                             
 12. NICHOLAS RESCHER, PARADOXES: THEIR ROOTS, RANGE, AND RESOLUTION xxi 
(Open Court Publishing Co. 2001). 
 13. Charles S. Chihara, The Semantic Paradoxes: A Diagnostic Investigation, 88 
PHIL. REV. 590 (1979). For a similar view, see R.M. SAINSBURY, PARADOXES 1 (2d ed. 
1995).  
 14. W.V. QUINE, THE WAYS OF PARADOX AND OTHER ESSAYS 7 (Random House Pub-
lishers 1966). 
 15. This distinction is not exhaustive. See RESCHER, supra note 12, at 72–73. 
 16. I use the term “deep inconsistency” to distinguish such paradoxes from mere con-
tradictions. The difference between the two terms lies in the way in which paradoxes 
make the “contradiction appear inescapable.” See PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-
AMENDMENT: A STUDY OF LOGIC, LAW, OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE 276 (Peter Lang 
Publishing) (1990). I will sometimes use the term “logical paradoxes” to refer to this type 
of paradoxes. 
 17. Another useful taxonomy is Quine’s distinction between “veridical” and “falsidi-
cal” paradoxes. QUINE, supra note 14, at 4–5. Veridical paradox is, in effect, a truth-
telling argument or proof; it establishes that some proposition is true or false (e.g., the 
Barber Paradox). Falsidical paradox, by contrast, “is one whose proposition not only 
seems at first absurd but also is false, there being fallacy in the purported proof.” A typi-
cal example is Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. Id. at 5. 
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To get a better sense of the notion of paradox, let us examine a specific 
and famous example, the paradox of the liar (“Liar Paradox”).18 Consider 
the following sentence: 
K1 This sentence is false. We can also present this sentence in the fol-
lowing format: K1 K1 is false. 
K1 produces a paradoxical loop: if it is true, it is false, and if it is false, 
it is true. Attributing a stable truth value to this sentence seems to be im-
possible. It is possible to structure a similar paradox that is hetero-
referential, rather than self-referential. Consider the following set of sen-
tences which, following Roy Sorensen, I will call the “Looped Liar Para-
dox”:19 
Plato:  What Socrates says is true. 
Socrates:  What Plato says is false. 
Like the Liar Paradox, it is impossible to attribute stable and coherent 
truth values to this pair.20 
A feature common to both the Liar Paradox and the Looped Liar Para-
dox is their semantic instability: their perpetual oscillation between truth 
and falsity.21 The Liar Paradox and the Looped Liar Paradox seem to 
suffer from some kind of semantic pathology that is unsettling because of 
the way in which it challenges our conventional grammatical structures 
and our usage of basic notions such as truth and reference.22 
                                                                                                             
 18. The discussion of semantical paradoxes involves the question of the meaning of 
truth and falsity. However, because of the deep controversy that exists within philosophy 
with respect to the meaning of truth, I have decided not to delve into this question. Within 
philosophy, one can find five major theories of truth: the Correspondence Theory; the 
Semantic Theory; the Deflationary (or Minimalist) Theory; the Coherence Theory, and 
the Pragmatic Theory. For a useful introduction to this debate, see Bradley Dowden & 
Norman Swartz, Truth, in THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/t/truth.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2007). Semantical paradoxes 
create a problem, though, for each of these theories. One initial assumption that I do 
make is that statements can be either true or false (the law of excluded middle). 
 19. ROY SORENSEN, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PARADOX: PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
LABYRINTHS OF THE MIND 211 (Oxford University Press 2003). This version of the liar 
can be traced back to the fourteenth century medieval thinker John Buridan. Id. at 201–
15. 
 20. One can construct a liar-like paradox that is non-circular. See Stephen Yablo, 
Paradox Without Self-Reference, 53 ANALYSIS 251, 251 n.1 (1993). 
 21. Hans Herzberger, Naive Semantics and the Liar Paradox, 79 J. PHIL. 479, 482 
(1982). 
 22. See also Adam Reiger, The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence, 54 
ERKENNTNIS 195 (2001). 
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2. Paradoxes in Law: Incoherence and Paralysis 
Logical and semantical paradoxes have existed for more than two 
thousand years. Early versions of the Liar Paradox can be found in Chris-
tian scriptures and Greek and medieval writings.23 These paradoxes have 
not, however, brought human thought to a standstill. While philosophers 
have continued to deliberate about the proper solution to the Liar Para-
dox, people have continued to use the notions of truth and falsity in their 
everyday reasoning and scientists have continued their search for true 
descriptions. However, the presence of paradoxes and deep inconsisten-
cies in the law seems more threatening and calls into question the capac-
ity of the law to fulfill its function as a reliable arbiter of social conflicts 
and as a source of normative expectations. Paradoxes can undermine 
these legal functions, either by leading to paralysis and deadlocks or by 
generating chaos and indeterminacy, causing people to replace the law 
with other forms of governance. 
Thus, the puzzle of legal paradoxicality deserves closer scrutiny. The 
first step toward resolution of this puzzle is to identify the proper refer-
ent of legal paradoxes. The most suitable candidate for this role is what I 
will call a “legal set”: a sequence of sentences that invoke, explicitly or 
implicitly, the legal code (the distinction between legal and illegal). A 
legal set may include three major types of normative sentences: norms, 
norm-propositions (statements about norms), or meta-propositions 
(statements about the entire legal system).24 These types of normative 
sentences may be: prescriptive (ought to), permissive (may) or prohibi-
tive (may not).25 Law includes additional types of norms, such as norms 
                                                                                                             
 23. SORENSEN, supra note 19, at 197. Other paradoxes, such as the paradoxes of mo-
tion attributed to Zeno, are also ancient. See id. at 49. Sorensen’s book provides a com-
prehensive discussion of the history of paradox. 
 24. See Jose Juan Moreso, Putting Legal Objectivity in its Place, 6 ANALISI E DIRITTO 
243, 243 (G. Giappichelli ed., 2004) (“[L]egal knowledge is obtained from statements 
like ‘Legally, all F have the obligation to pay T ’ or ‘Legally, x has the right to recover 
damages D’. These statements express norm propositions. Norm propositions are the 
meaings of norm statements. . . . Normative statements have a descriptive nature; they are 
statements about the existence of norms. . . . Norm propositions about the existence of 
legal norms can be called ‘legal propositions’.”) (citations omitted). 
 25. See Sven Ove Hansson, Situationist Deontic Logic, 26 J. PHIL. LOG. 423, 428 
(1997). “All Israeli citizens are obligated not to emit sewage into the sea” is an example 
of a prohibitive norm. “Israeli law prohibits the emission of sewage into the sea” is an 
example of norm proposition; it is a proposition about the existence of a legal norm. “The 
Israeli legal system is a combination of the common law and civil law traditions” is a 
meta-proposition. Two other normative types that are mentioned in the literature are: “it 
is gratuitous that” and “it is optional that.” Something is gratuitous if and only if it is not 
obligatory, and it is optional if and only if neither it, nor its negation, is obligatory. See 
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conferring public or private powers⎯ competence norms (the compe-
tence to issue other norms) or determinative norms (norms that define 
certain concepts).26 One way in which a legal set may be formed is to 
extract a segment from a law’s printed history (understood as the entire 
genealogy of rules and case law pertaining to a particular legal do-
main).27 A paradox arises whenever a legal set, or a portion of it, is self-
contradictory, and when this self-contradiction is supported by appar-
ently good reasons.28 
Two primary features of legal paradoxes distinguish them from logical 
and semantical paradoxes. These differences influence, as I will demon-
strate, the practical consequences of paradoxes in law. The first distinc-
tive feature of legal paradoxes concerns the unique composition of the 
legal set. Because legal sets may include both norms and propositional 
statements, their contradictory form is not limited to conflicting attribu-
tions of truth and falsity.29 This is because norms are usually thought to 
lack truth value.30 The second distinctive feature of legal paradoxes, to 
which I will return later in Sections IV and V, relates to their dynamic 
quality. It reflects the fact that law is a social system and not a static reg-
ister of norms. In other words, legal paradoxes influence the world of 
action and should be examined with this in mind. 
Let me delay, for a moment, the discussion of the systemic impact of 
legal paradoxes and consider them in light of the peculiarities of a legal 
                                                                                                             
Paul McNamara, Deontic Logic, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1.2 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/ 
logic-deontic/#1.2. 
 26. For these additional types, see Eugenio Bulygin, On Norms of Competence, 11 
LAW & PHIL. 201 (1992). 
 27. But one can also form a legal set by using second-order observations of the law—
for example, by giving an account of a certain theory of law. Theorizing in law reflects 
either an attempt to study “how far principles, notions, and rules for decision-making can 
be generalized,” or a meta-attempt to expose the general structure of the law. NIKLAS 
LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 54–55 (Fatima Kastner, Richard Nobles, David 
Schiff & Rosamund Ziegert eds., Klaus A. Ziegert trans., Oxford University Press 2004) 
(1993). For more on the role and nature of legal theories, see David E. Van Zandt, The 
Relevance of Social Theory to Legal Theory, 83 NW. U.L. REV. 10 (1989). 
 28. A different but related problem is indeterminacy. See infra Section IV.B (discuss-
ing the Truth-Teller Paradox). 
 29. However, norm-propositions—propositions that state that a given action is obliga-
tory (required), permitted (allowed), or forbidden (prohibited) according to a given 
norm—can have truth value. 
 30. As Henrik von Wright puts it: “Norms as prescriptions of human conduct . . . may 
be pronounced (un)reasonable, (un)just, or (in)valid when judged by some standards 
which are themselves normative—but not true or false.” Georg Henrik von Wright, Is 
There a Logic of Norms, 4 RATIO JURIS 265, 266 (1991). 
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set. I do not intend to provide a formal account of the way in which le-
gal-oriented sentences can relate to or contradict each other.31 For my 
purposes, it will suffice to give an intuitive account of what is unique in 
legal inconsistency and provide a few paradigmatic examples. A legal set 
may be inconsistent when it can be shown to contain contradictory 
norms. Norms or rules can be contradictory, for example, when one rule 
permits what another forbids, or when two rules issue contradictory di-
rectives, such that simultaneous compliance with both directives is im-
possible.32 A further form of inconsistency arises when one can find con-
flicting interpretations of the same legal concept within a legal set. An-
other form of inconsistency arises when one can show that a legal set 
contains contradictory assignments of validity. The notion of validity 
plays, as I will argue later, a unique role in the law⎯something akin to 
the notion of truth in logic. It is the validity of the law that makes its 
normative statements binding.33 
Let us consider two examples of legal paradoxes, beginning with a le-
gal version of the Liar Paradox. I follow the conventional Deontic nota-
tion with OBp denoting “it is obligatory that p.” 
O1 It is obligatory not to follow this rule. This can also be presented 
as: O1 O~O1.34 
This statement (interpreted as a norm rather than as a norm-
proposition) is self-contradictory⎯it generates conflicting directives. It 
is similar to the following prescription: 
O2 It is obligatory not to smoke in bars and it is obligatory to smoke in 
bars. 
The self-contradictory nature of O1 and O2 makes it impossible to sat-
isfy them⎯their satisfaction set is empty. Impossibility is the pathologi-
cal symptom that accompanies normative contradiction.35 
                                                                                                             
 31. Deontic logic represents an attempt to provide such a formalistic account. How-
ever, this formalistic presentation is not really necessary for the arguments presented 
here. See, e.g., id.; McNamara, supra note 25, § 1.2. 
 32. See von Wright, supra note 30, at 270–71. This form of inconsistency could give 
rise to conflicting normative expectations. 
 33. Note, however, that since legal sets may also include “normal” propositions, and 
may invoke classical reasoning patterns (even if this is done only implicitly and non-
exclusively), they can also be contradictory in the sense that this notion is used in pro-
positional logic (i.e., through inconsistent attributions of truth and falsity). On the role of 
classical deductive patterns in legal reasoning, see generally Arend Soeteman, Legal 
Logic? Or Can We Do Without?, 11 ARTIF. INTELL. L. 197 (2003). 
 34. McNamara, supra note 25, § 1.2. 
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The paradoxes of law tend, however, to be more subtle than these ex-
amples. So let us consider a less blunt example. This example follows the 
Greek story of Protagoras and Euathlus. I will follow the story as it was 
told by Aulus Gellius.36 Protagoras, “the keenest of all Sophists,” taught 
rhetoric and argumentation.37 Euathlus, who wished to be instructed in 
the art of oratory and the pleading of causes (what is called law today), 
became a pupil of Protagoras. 38 It was agreed between the two that 
Euathlus would pay Protagoras’s fee after Euathlus won his first case.39 
After having been a pupil and follower of Protagoras for some time, and 
having made considerable progress in the study of oratory, Euathlus had 
not undertaken any cases.40 Protagoras decided to demand his fee accord-
ing to the contract, and he brought a suit against Euathlus.41 
Protagoras and Euathlus presented their arguments before the court. 
Protagoras began as follows: 
Let me tell you, most foolish of youths, that in either event you will 
have to pay what I am demanding, whether judgment be pronounced 
for or against you. For if the case goes against you, the money will be 
due me in accordance with the verdict, because I have won; but if the 
                                                                                                             
 35. I follow Vranas here. See Peter B.M. Vranas, New Foundations for Deontic 
Logic: A Preliminary Sketch 4, available at http://www.public.iastate.edu/~vranas/ 
Homesite/papers/deonticweb.doc (2002). Note, however, that while O1 and O2 are self-
contradictory, a norm-proposition that describes a norm that is self-contradictory can be 
true and non-contradictory. See Lennart Aqvist, Interpretations of Deontic Logic, 73 
MIND 246, 249 (1964). It is also possible to construct looped contradictory obligations 
with similar consequences: 
O3 You ought to follow rule O4. 
O4  You ought not to follow rule O3. 
 36. 1 AULUS GELLIUS, THE ATTIC NIGHTS OF AULUS GELLIUS 404–09 (E.H. Warming-
ton ed., John C. Rolfe trans., Harvard University Press rev. ed. 1970) (1927). All of the 
following quotes are from Gellius, id. This account was written roughly six hundred 
years after the events took place (if they did indeed occur) since it is assumed that Prota-
goras lived from 492 to 421 B.C.E. See J.A. Davison, Protagoras, Democritus, and 
Anaxagoras, 3 CLASSICAL QUART. 33, 38 (1953). This paradox was discussed by other 
ancient writers. See, e.g., Jordan Howard Sobel, The Law Student and his Teacher, LIII 
THEORIA 1 (1987). 
 37. GELLIUS, supra note 36, at 405. 
 38. Id. Protagoras drafted the Constitution of Thuria and likely taught in the Sicilian 
School of Rhetoric. Davison, supra note 36, at 33, 37. 
 39. Gellius writes that Euathlus paid Protagoras half of the fee before beginning his 
lessons and agreed to pay the remaining half “on the day when he first pleaded before 
jurors and won his case.” GELLIUS, supra note 36, at 407. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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decision be in your favour, the money will be due me according to our 
contract, since you will have won a case.42 
To this Euathlus replied: 
I might have met this sophism of yours, tricky as it is, by not pleading 
my own cause but employing another as my advocate. But I take 
greater satisfaction in a victory in which I defeat you, not only in the 
suit, but also in this argument of yours. So let me tell you in turn, wis-
est of masters, that in either event I shall not have to pay what you de-
mand, whether judgment be pronounced for or against me. For if the ju-
rors decide in my favour, according to their verdict nothing will be due 
you, because I have won; but if they give judgment against me, by the 
terms of our contract I shall owe you nothing, because I have not won a 
case.43 
Gellius concludes the story by noting that the court was struck by the 
intricacy of the arguments and refused to give a ruling: 
. . . the jurors, thinking that the plea on both sides was uncertain and in-
soluble, for fear that their decision, for whichever side it was rendered, 
might annul itself, left the matter undecided and postponed the case to a 
distant day. Thus a celebrated master of oratory was refuted by his 
youthful pupil with his own argument, and his cleverly devised soph-
ism failed.44 
The story of Protagoras and Euathlus reveals an internal paradox 
within the normative structure governing this case, leading⎯at least ac-
cording to Gellius⎯to a decisional paralysis.45 To make the paradox 
more precise, let us disentangle the story into a series of norms and 
norm-propositions. 
(1) In deciding a contractual dispute, a court should 
give effect to and enforce the contractual com-
mitments made by the parties. 
(2) According to the contract made between Prota-
goras and Euathlus, Euathlus will pay the full 
fee only after he won his first case. Protagoras 
brought a suit against Euathlus claiming his fee. 
This was Euathlus’s first case. 
(3) Hence, according to (1), Protagoras’s suit should 
be rejected since, at the time the court was re-
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 407–09. 
 44. GELLIUS, supra note 36, at 409. 
 45. Id. at 405. 
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quired to give a ruling, the contractual condition 
had not been fulfilled. 
(4) If the court rejects Protagoras’s suit (ruling for 
Euathlus), it will, by this very act, fulfill the con-
tractual condition, thus completing Protagoras’s 
cause of action.46 
(5) Hence, according to (1), Protagoras’s suit should 
be accepted. 
(6) If the court accepts Protagoras’s suit, Euathlus 
will in fact lose; by its ruling, the court will 
cause the contractual condition to not be ful-
filled. 
(7) Hence, according to (1), Protagoras’s suit should 
be rejected. 
Statements (3), (5), and (7) are contradictory. Attempting to reason 
about the correct legal answer leads to a seemingly insoluble oscillation, 
in which a ruling for Euathlus leads to a ruling for Protagoras, which 
leads to a ruling for Euathlus, ad infinitum.47 The paradox is generated by 
the fact that⎯due to the contract’s peculiar structure⎯the correct legal 
answer (which should be reflected in the ruling) depends in an unsettling 
way on the court’s ultimate ruling.48 This pathological oscillation is simi-
lar to the semantic instability generated by the Liar Paradox; in the legal 
context it may lead to judicial paralysis, as was reported by Gellius.49 
However, in law, paralysis is not an acceptable option. Legal decisions, 
unlike decisions in science, math, or philosophy, cannot be deferred to a 
later date.50 That decisions must be made is, in itself, a basic norm of any 
legal system. 
Indeed, the praxis of law seems to adhere to this basic precept, show-
ing few signs of paradoxical stoppages. This may signal that the role 
                                                                                                             
 46. This proposition builds on the fact that the ruling operates as a performative 
speech-act. Such speech-acts have the capacity to make themselves true or binding by 
being pronounced in adequate circumstances. See Lennart Aqvist, Some Remarks on 
Performatives in the Law, 11 ARTIF. INTELL. L. 105, 106, 110 (2003). 
 47. See Sobel, supra note 36, at 10. 
 48. See id. 
 49. GELLIUS, supra note 36, at 405. 
 50. This is not always recognized by philosophers. Thus, Jordan Howard Sobel notes, 
for example, that “rather than reach a final disposition in the case a court might be moved 
to suspend the case, to put off or postpone judgment to a later day. This action could 
recommend itself as a desperate expedient to avoid self-contradiction: deferral could 
recommend itself to a court that considered, whether correctly or incorrectly, that it had 
no other way out of a logical trap.” Sobel, supra note 36, at 4. 
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paradoxes are playing in law is not really pathological. With this in mind, 
let us return to the story of Protagoras and Euathlus. Despite its seeming 
insolubility, there are several ways in which this paradox may be re-
solved (or dissolved). They are based on two primary techniques: intro-
ducing a distinction (reinterpretation) or appealing to external princi-
ples.51 
Consider, first, the option of reinterpretation. The court has several 
ways to reinterpret the foregoing problematic normative cluster. The first 
option disentangles the temporal components of the paradox. In deter-
mining the status of the parties’ rights and obligations, the court does not 
need to take a forward-looking approach; that is, it does not have to con-
sider the consequences of its ruling on the parties’ contractual obliga-
tions. Rather it needs only to assess their rights as they are at the moment 
of its decision. According to this interpretation, (3) represents the correct 
decision, implying that Protagoras’s suit was premature, and (5) and (7) 
are simply incorrect. This interpretation lays the foundation, though, for 
a future suit by Protagoras.52 
Another approach seeks to resolve the paradox by focusing on its self-
referential aspect. Thus, the phrase “first case” may be interpreted as not 
applicable to a case involving Protagoras and Euathlus as parties, barring 
the problematic self-reference that is generated by the contract. This re-
quires us to reformulate (2), again resolving the paradox and leading to a 
ruling against Protagoras. 
While the foregoing solutions are not uniquely legal, the appeal to ex-
ternal principles reflects an alogical approach because it does not seek to 
resolve the paradox through the introduction of further distinctions; 
rather, it dissolves the paradox through an appeal to hierarchically supe-
rior normative principles. Thus, the court may invoke the “good-faith” 
principle and conclude that Protagoras’s scheme was dishonest. Alterna-
tively, the contract could be revised in equity. Euathlus could be ordered 
to pay earnest money while making a reasonable effort to take on another 
case or to pay reasonable sum for the time Protagoras had already de-
voted to his instruction.53 
                                                                                                             
 51. For a broader discussion of the problem of paradox resolution, see RESCHER, su-
pra note 12, at 57–58. 
 52. This solution was pointed to by Leibniz, who discussed this paradox in one of his 
papers. See Sobel, supra note 36, at 7–9. See also SUBER, supra note 16, at 242. 
 53. See Sobel, supra note 36, at 7–9. 
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B. Paradoxes in the Westphalian Order: The Cases of the WTO and the 
ICC 
This Section explores the deep inconsistency that is associated with the 
Westphalian scheme of validity as it is invoked in two key treaty-
regimes: the WTO and the ICC. This deep inconsistency is generated, as 
we shall see, by the fact that both regimes cling to the traditional West-
phalian scheme, while simultaneously introducing conflicting validation 
and law-making techniques. 
1. The Case of the WTO 
“The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only interna-
tional organization dealing with the global rules of trade be-
tween nations. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows 
as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible.”54 
At first glance, the WTO looks like a classic product of the West-
phalian order. The WTO regime is the product of a complex web of trea-
ties that were signed in 1994 after a long negotiation process during the 
Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1994.55 The constitutional core of this web 
consists of two agreements: the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO Agreement”), which is the umbrella instrument, 
and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes (“DSU”), which establishes the WTO legal system.56 
The WTO Agreement includes various provisions that allude to the 
Westphalian notion of validation, with its emphasis on state consent and 
the associated ideal of national sovereignty. Thus, for example, Article 
XIV (which deals with “Acceptance, Entry into Force, and Deposit”) and 
Article XII (which deals with “Accession”) provide that accepting the 
authority of the WTO requires a formal act from the joining state.57 The 
WTO does not claim to have universal jurisdiction. In the same spirit, 
Article XV (which deals with the issue of “Withdrawal”) states that 
                                                                                                             
 54. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN BRIEF 1 
(2007), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf. 
 55. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 9 (3rd ed. 2007), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf. 
 56. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
2, art. III(3), Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 
I.L.M 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. The DSU is annexed to the WTO Agreement and 
thus derives its validity from the former agreement. Id.  
 57. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization arts. XIV, XII, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
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“[a]ny Member may withdraw from this Agreement.”58 Similarly, the 
DSU includes a provision which seeks to protect the rights of member 
states and to preclude the possibility that these rights will be altered by 
the WTO judicial bodies. Article 3.2 of the DSU states that: 
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in pro-
viding security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The 
Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations 
of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing 
provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rul-
ings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements.59 
The Westphalian vision, reflected in the provision quoted above, postu-
lates the dispute settlement body as a highly controllable entity that is 
completely dependent on the states that have established it. Article 3.2 of 
the DSU gives the WTO judicial bodies a very limited role: they are ex-
pected merely to preserve the rights and obligations of members under 
the covered agreements and to clarify their meaning.60 Article 3.2 thus 
portrays the WTO as a static normative space, whose contours were to-
tally determined by the member states. 
This portrait of the WTO system fails to appreciate, however, the 
highly autonomous character of the WTO legal system.61 It disregards 
the powers of the WTO’s new legal system, which⎯contrary to the 
above portrait⎯has been actively shaping the normative field of the 
WTO, independently of the wishes and preferences of the member 
states.62 This autonomy is formally codified in articles 16.4, 17.14, and 
23 of the DSU, which jointly transform the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism into an obligatory system, insulated from political interven-
tion.63 In various rulings since 1995, the WTO judicial bodies have cre-
ated new rights and obligations that did not exist as such before these 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. art. XV. 
 59. DSU, supra note 56, art. 3.2 (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. 
 61. This tension is also highlighted by Sol Picciotto: “The WTO’s dispute settlement 
procedures involved a significant shift toward a more legalistic model of adjudication 
than in the GATT. . . . Nevertheless, the legitimacy of WTO rules is still defended on the 
grounds that they have been agreed by governments.” Sol Picciotto, The WTO’s Appel-
late Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance, 18 GOVERNANCE 
477, 495 (2005). 
 62. Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303, 
347 (2004). 
 63. DSU, supra note 56, arts. 16.4, 17.14, 23. 
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decisions and depart substantively from the legal tradition of the 
GATT.64 
2. The International Criminal Court 
“The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent, 
permanent court that tries persons accused of the most serious 
crimes of international concern, namely genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.”65 
A similar tension also exists in the new regime of the International 
Criminal Court. The ICC was created after long and protracted negotia-
tions that culminated in the adoption of the Rome Statute on 17 July 
1998.66 The Rome Statute provides that the ICC will have jurisdiction 
over crimes of genocide, certain crimes against humanity, and certain 
war crimes.67 On first reading, the ICC seems like another prototype of 
the Westphalian model⎯a treaty produced through inter-state bargain-
ing. This conclusion is supported by Article 126(1) of the Rome Statute, 
which stipulates that the Statute shall enter into force after the deposit of 
the sixtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.68 This provision refers 
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda as the treaty’s source of validity. 
The Westphalian order also underlies Article 4(2), which deals with the 
legal status and powers of the ICC. Article 4(2) provides that “[t]he 
Court may exercise its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, 
                                                                                                             
 64. On the norm-making powers of the WTO tribunals, see Guzman, supra note 62, at 
347; Picciotto, supra note 61, at 495; OREN PEREZ, ECOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND 
GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: RETHINKING THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT CONFLICT 65–80 
(Hart Publishing 2004). Two prominent examples of law made by the WTO judicial bod-
ies are the Appellate Body decisions that both it and the panels have wide discretion to 
accept amicus curiae briefs from non-state parties and its novel interpretation of Article 
XX. For a discussion of these issues see PEREZ, supra, at 65–80, 100–05. See Appellate 
Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
¶¶ 79–91, 99–110 WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities—Measures Affecting the Prohibition of Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products ¶¶ 50–57, 155–157 WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). 
 65. International Criminal Court, About the Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html 
(last visited Aug. 14, 2007). 
 66. United Nations, United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court, http://www.un.org/news/facts/iccfact.htm (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2007). 
 67. Rome Statute of the International Court art. 5, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Rome 
Statute is also commonly referred to as the ICC Treaty. 
 68. Id. art. 126(1). 
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on the territory of any State Party and, by special agreement, on the ter-
ritory of any other State.”69 
However, upon closer inspection, the Rome Statute seems to include 
provisions that challenge the Westphalian validity scheme.70 This is re-
flected in its claim to hold jurisdiction over citizens of non-parties,71 in 
the establishment of new universal criminal norms that transcend cus-
tomary international law as it existed prior to the establishment of the 
Rome Statute,72 in the formal legal recognition of non-state actors (vic-
tims and NGOs),73 and finally, in the decision-making powers that are 
given to the Court.74 
It is worthwhile to explore the nearly universal jurisdiction given to the 
Court in Article 12, which provides the Court with jurisdiction over per-
sons who are not citizens of one of the signatories to the ICC.75 Accord-
ing to Article 12, the ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute a national of any 
state when crimes within the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction are 
committed on the territory of a state that is a party to the treaty or that 
consents to ICC jurisdiction for that case.76 The Court is thus empowered 
to exercise jurisdiction even in cases in which the defendant’s state of 
nationality is not a party to the treaty and does not consent to the exercise 
of jurisdiction.77 The jurisdictional principle underlying Article 12 stands 
in stark contrast to the constitutional principle of state consent. This de-
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. art. 4(2) (emphasis added). 
 70. For a more detailed discussion of the tension between the ICC regime and the 
Westpahlian validity scheme, see Jackson N. Maogoto, The Final Balance Sheet? The 
International Criminal Court’s Challenges and Concessions to the Westphalian Model 4, 
14 (Berkeley Electronic Press, Working Paper No. 1402, 2006), available at 
http://law.bpress.com/expresso/eps/1402; Leila Nadya Sadat & Richard Carden, The New 
International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 385, 390–91 
(2000); Morris, supra note 8, at 30–33. 
 71. Rome Statute, supra note 67, art. 12. 
 72. Id. arts. 5–8. 
 73. Id. art. 15 (providing that the prosecutor may initiate investigations on the basis of 
information received from non-governmental organizations). See also Maogoto supra 
note 70, at 7. 
 74. Rome Statute, supra note 67, art. 19(1) (“The Court shall satisfy itself that it has 
jurisdiction in any case brought before it.”); id. art. 21 (providing the Court with the 
power to derive new international legal principles from “national laws of legal systems of 
the world,”); id. art. 119(1) (endowing the Court with the authority to settle disputes 
“concerning the judicial functions.”). See also Morris, supra note 8, at 30–33. 
 75. Rome Statute, supra note 67, art 12. 
 76. Id. art. 12(2)(a). This is in addition to jurisdiction based on Security Council ac-
tion under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and jurisdiction based on consent by the defen-
dant’s state of nationality. 
 77. Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction over Non-Signatory Nationals, 33 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 6 (2000); Morris, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
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viation is particularly striking when the Rome Statute is compared to the 
ICJ Statute and the ICJ jurisdictional jurisprudence.78 
Some proponents of the ICC regime have tried to explain this internal 
inconsistency by arguing that the ICC’s jurisdiction over the nationals of 
non-party states is based, in effect, on existing principles of customary 
international law. According to this view, the ICC jurisdiction is based 
upon: 
. . . the principles of universal jurisdiction pursuant to which the courts 
of any state may prosecute the nationals of any state for certain serious 
international crimes. Since any individual state could prosecute perpe-
trators regardless of their nationality, they reason, a group of states may 
create an international court empowered to do the same.79 
In a recent article, Madeline Morris demonstrated that this thesis has 
no basis in contemporary customary international law.80 She argues that 
the delegated universal jurisdiction theory does not account for a number 
of crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC that are not 
subject to universal jurisdiction.81 Additionally, the intricate institutional 
structure established by the Rome Statute, with the unique enforcement 
and interpretative powers it provides to the court and the prosecutor, cre-
ates a legal environment that is radically different from the one envi-
sioned by the decentralized model that existed prior to the establishment 
of the ICC.82 Thus, consent to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
individual states is not equivalent to consent to universal jurisdiction 
delegated to an international court.83 
III. ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF NORMATIVE GROUNDING 
The Westphalian doctrine of validity, with its emphasis on consensual 
norm creation through state negotiation, does not seem to cohere with 
contemporary legal practices. The normative deficit that was created by 
the demise of the Westphalian scheme is being populated by alternative 
forms of validation. Four legal ideas emerge as particularly noteworthy 
in this respect, and I will discuss each of them briefly: global democracy, 
deference to non-legal rationalities, direct individual consent, and the 
new association between law and technology. These alternative schemes 
                                                                                                             
 78. See Morris, supra note 8, at 20–21. 
 79. Id. at 27–28. See also Paust, supra note 77, at 3. 
 80. Morris, supra note 8, at 13, 56–60. 
 81. Id. at 28. 
 82. See id. at 29. 
 83. Id. Some authors have tried to explain ICC jurisdiction by appealing to universal 
moral principles. I will return to the issue in Section III.B. 
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challenge the classic conceptions of international law, generating a new 
and deeply complex legal universe.84 However, as we consider each of 
these alternative schemes more closely, it becomes obvious that the pro-
ject of providing solid foundations to the international legal system fails 
not just because of the deep differences between these varied normative 
schemes, but also because when considered separately, they yield incon-
sistencies that are as problematic as the ones generated by the conven-
tional Westphalian doctrine. These horizontal and intrinsic paradoxes 
cast doubt upon the claim that these alternative doctrines provide a new, 
universal model of validity. 
A. Global Democracy? 
Global democracy is invoked increasingly⎯in both theory and prac-
tice⎯as a new form of validation that imagines the democratic principle 
as a truly global idea, undercutting the role of the state.85 Unlike the idea 
of global democracy, the Westphalian doctrine has limited aspirations 
regarding the regulation of the political process.86 The consent require-
ment underlying the Westphalian doctrine was interpreted as a purely 
formalistic condition of constitutional adequacy87 that does not set sub-
stantive requirements to national political structures. Some authors have 
argued that the Westphalian principle of consent should be read as a re-
quirement to subject the transnational diplomatic process to substantial 
                                                                                                             
 84. This complexity cannot be captured by unidimensional concepts such as the “pro-
liferation of international courts.” Guillaume Speech 2000, supra note 1. For a discussion 
of this complexity in the context of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), see Maria Panezi & Peer Zumbansen, The United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with author). 
 85. The most prominent voice in this school of thought is that of David Held. See, 
e.g., David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Globalization Tamed?, 29 REV. INT’L STUD. 465, 
472 (2003). 
 86. Thus, in the Vienna Convention the only hint of tension between the formal con-
sent of the state and the will of the people is indirect. Article 46 provides that: 
(1) A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has 
been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding compe-
tence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was 
manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance;  
 
(2) A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State con-
ducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good 
faith. 
Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 46 (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. art. 7. 
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domestic political scrutiny; this interpretation seeks to portray the act of 
consent as a product of meaningful political deliberation.88 However, 
under the Westphalian scheme, the state retains the authority to structure 
the domestic political process.89 Further, the political model that emerges 
from this interpretation is highly fragmented⎯unlike the unified vision 
underlying the model of global democracy.90 
However, choosing the principle of global democracy as an alternative 
source of validity raises various difficulties pertaining both to its theo-
retical underpinnings and to its global applicability. From a theoretical 
perspective, the vision of global democratization is torn between several 
potentially conflicting commitments. The proponents of global democra-
tization invoke several core commitments: first, a commitment to inclu-
siveness and open decision-making structures; second, a commitment to 
a decision-making process that is based on the possibility of reaching 
agreement through rational deliberation; third, a commitment to individ-
ual freedom and fundamental human rights; fourth, a commitment to the 
value of cultural pluralism; and finally, a commitment to embed these 
core commitments in global governance institutions.91 
These commitments conflict in various ways. First, the establishment 
of strong global institutions⎯replacing the fragmented and relatively 
weak bodies that characterize the contemporary international order⎯is in 
tension with the commitment to individual freedom and cultural plural-
ism. As the distance between the global political center and the citizen 
body grows, so does the risk that the voice of the citizen and the local 
community will be ignored. A strong central establishment constitutes, 
therefore, a risk to individual freedom and cultural pluralism. Second, it 
is not clear whether the commitment to open deliberation and consensual 
decision-making can be realized, given the vast cultural and ideological 
differences that characterize the contemporary global society. It is not 
clear what kind of criteria could guide this deliberative effort, given that 
choosing any particular criterion could jeopardize the commitment to 
pluralism. The political institutions of majority voting and parliamentary 
representation offer a way to circumvent this normative deficit, but they 
do not resolve it. 
                                                                                                             
 88. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic 
Law: Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-Economic Ar-
eas, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 189, 231 (1999). 
 89. Held, supra note 85, at 466. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See generally Held, supra note 85; Michael Walzer, International Society: What is 
the Best that We Can Do? (Sch. of Soc. Sci. Inst. for Advanced Study, Occasional Papers 
No. 8, 2000), available at  http://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/papers/papereight.pdf. 
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These dilemmas have been apparent in the few attempts to implement 
the vision of global democracy. Thus, for example, in 2000, the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) made an am-
bitious attempt to develop a governance structure based on an electroni-
cally-mediated model of representative democracy.92 ICANN tried to use 
the Internet to create legitimacy, first by opening its decision-making 
process to the public (transparency), and second, by conducting global, 
Internet-based elections for its central governing body (the At-Large 
Membership Program).93 ICANN’s experiment was heavily criticized 
due to its failure to achieve true global representation and responsiveness 
to civic concerns, leading the organization to abandon its ambitious de-
mocratic aspirations.94 Other institutions⎯such as the Global Reporting 
Initiative (“GRI”)⎯have established multi-stakeholder consultation 
processes, reflecting a commitment to consensual decision-making.95 
Despite the relative success of the GRI, the consultation procedures it 
established do not constitute a formal democratic structure; to some ex-
tent, the success of the GRI may be attributed to the limited 
field⎯sustainability reporting—in which it operated.96 The tensions that 
underlie the theoretical articulations of the idea of global democracy 
were not resolved by the few practical attempts to design global democ-
ratic institutions. The idea of global democratization remains a deeply 
contested notion, both in theory and in practice. 
                                                                                                             
 92. See ICANN, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policies, 
http://www.icann.org/udrp/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2007). 
 93. John G. Palfrey, The End of the Experiment: How ICANN’s Foray into Global 
Internet Democracy Failed, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 410, 412–414 (2004). 
 94. ICANN’s experiment failed in the sense that ICANN has radically changed its 
governance structure by adopting a much milder concept of democracy. Nonetheless, 
ICANN’s experiment still constitutes an important milestone in the attempt to transform 
the abstract idea of global democratization into a practical model. For a detailed discus-
sion and critique of ICANN’s democratic experiment, see Palfrey, supra note 93, at 412. 
 95. For details about the GRI, see Global Reporting Initiative [GRI], 
http://www.globalreporting.org. The World Wide Web Consortium provides another 
example of an attempt to design global standards through multi-stakeholder consultation. 
See World Wide Web Consortium, http://www.w3.org/. The rule-making process at the 
International Organization for Standardization is a good example of a consensual struc-
ture among closed communities. See Oren Perez, Global Legal Pluralism and Electronic 
Democracy, in ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY: MOBILISATION, ORGANIZATION AND 
PARTICIPATION VIA NEW ICTS 133, 133, 143–44 (Rachel K. Gibson, Andrea Roemmele & 
Stephen J. Ward eds., Routledge 2004). 
 96. I discuss the institutional structure of the GRI in more detail in the last section of 
this Article. See infra notes 234–239 and accompanying text. 
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B. Deference to Non-Legal Rationality 
The attempt to look for grounding in external, non-legal rationalities 
has been most visible in the field of human rights. The appeal to univer-
sal moral principles as a ground for new global legal norms is particu-
larly noteworthy in two contexts: the problematic jurisdiction of the ICC 
and the question of humanitarian intervention. Some authors have tried 
to justify the novel ICC jurisdiction by what amounts, in effect, to a di-
rect appeal to moral principles.97 The ICC Treaty belongs, it was argued, 
to a new genre of treaties that are “globally binding because they foster 
the common interests of humanity.”98 In the context of humanitarian in-
tervention, authors have argued for the emergence of a new grund norm: 
a principle of civilian inviolability.99 
However, the appeal to this new source of validity seems problematic 
not only because the choice of the pivotal norm seems somewhat arbi-
trary, but also because the meaning of the proposed norms remains ex-
tremely fuzzy. As Madeline Morris argued in a recent article: 
A threshold problem with the theory of global treaties is that there will 
inevitably be disagreement about what in fact will serve the common 
interests of humanity. An equally formidable problem confronting the 
theory of global treaties is that, even if that which would serve the 
common interests of humanity could be dispositively identified, that 
alone would not bind states who would find unacceptable a particular 
distribution of the burdens involved in serving those interests.100 
                                                                                                             
 97. Morris, supra note 8, at 26. 
 98. Id. at 52. 
 99. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William W. Burke-White, An International Consti-
tutional Moment 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1 (2002). Other authors have proposed a different 
principle, “a responsibility to protect.” See, e.g., Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The 
Responsibility to Protect, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 99, 101 (2002); Bruce, W. Jentleson, A Re-
sponsibility to Protect, 28 HARV. INT’L L.J. 18, 18 (2007). See also Held, supra note 91, 
at 471–72 (arguing for a new global order based on two meta-moral principles: the 
metaprinciple of autonomy and the metaprinciple of impartialist reasoning). For a critique 
of the Slaughter and Burke-White view (which is applicable to the other proposals), see 
Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Redefining Sovereignty via International Constitutional Mo-
ments? The Case of Afghanistan, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER 
THE END OF THE COLD WAR 335 (Mary Ellen O’Connell, Michael Bothe & Natalino 
Ronzitti eds., Transnational Pub. 2005); Jean L. Cohen, Whose Sovereignty? Empire 
Versus International Law, 18 ETHICS AND INT’L AFF. 1 (2004). 
 100. Morris, supra note 8, at 52. 
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The deep vagueness of these new postulated norms calls for further in-
terpretation and sets the ground for interpretative disputes.101 It is not 
clear what criteria will govern such disputes or which authority will de-
cide them. The suggested new grund norms do not resolve these ques-
tions. 
Similar appeals to non-legal rationalities can be found in other do-
mains. In the environmental domain, we can find reference to a new en-
vironmental ethics, epitomized in the concept of sustainable develop-
ment102 and in the precautionary principle.103 Environmental ethics pro-
vides an additional and independent mode of justification, operating 
alongside other forms of groundings.104 Science has also been used in-
creasingly as a mode of grounding, especially in the trade and environ-
ment domains.105 In both of these domains, the problems of choosing 
between the competing external sources and the indeterminacy of the 
external principles remain unresolved.106 We are confronted, again, not 
                                                                                                             
 101. Similar problems afflict the question of humanitarian intervention. See, e.g., Ji-
anming Shen, The Non-Intervention Principle and Humanitarian Interventions Under 
International Law, 7 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 1 (2001). 
 102. On the principle of sustainable development, see ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR 
SUSTAINABILITY: A READER 13–17, 373–75 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood 
eds., Hart Pub. 2006). 
 103. On the precautionary principle, see id. at 361–64. 
 104. Two prominent examples are the WTO Agreement, which includes in its pream-
ble a reference to the principle of sustainable development, and the GRI 2006 sustainabil-
ity guidelines, which open with a reference to the principle of sustainable development. 
WTO Agreement, supra note 57, pmbl.; GRI, G3 Guidelines, http://www.global 
reporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/ED9E9B36-AB54-4DE1-BFF2-5F735235CA44/0/G3_Guide 
linesENU.pdf at 2 [hereinafter GRI G3]. The WTO tribunals have relied on the invoca-
tion of the principle of sustainability in justifying their new (pro-environment) interpreta-
tion of article XX. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note 64, at ¶¶ 153, 155. For a discussion of 
the WTO trade and environment jurisprudence, see PEREZ, supra note 64, at 65–80. 
 105. A good example is the deference to science in the WTO Agreement on the Appli-
cation of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”) definition of risk 
assessment, in which science rather than law provides the criteria for proper risk assess-
ment. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, arts, 2, 5, 
Annex A(4) 1867 U.N.T.S. 493. For a discussion, see PEREZ, supra note 64, at 155–158. 
The Climate Change Convention provides another example through its reliance on the 
work and judgment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”). See 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, http://www.ipcc.ch/ (last visited Oct. 13, 
2007). 
 106. See e.g., Oren Perez, The Institutionalization of Inconsistency: From Fluid Con-
cepts to Random Walk, in PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN LAW 119, 128–36 (Oren 
Perez & Gunther Teubner eds., 2006); Oren Perez, Anomalies at the Precautionary King-
dom: Reflections on the GMO Panel’s Decision, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 265, 265, 267 
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just by conflicting interpretations of the same extra-legal authority (e.g., 
environmental ethics), but also by deep uncertainty as to how these di-
vergent authorities relate to each other. There seems to be no agreement 
with respect to how these competing forms of rationality could be ranked 
and their domains of applicability defined. Indeed, there is no unified 
moral theory that could bring these different world views under a single 
umbrella in a way that would be globally accepted (successfully bridging 
between the cultural-moral disagreements that characterize the contem-
porary global society). 
C. Individual Consent 
The doctrine of individual consent forms a third pattern of validation. 
The idea of individual consent draws both on universal principles of con-
tract law and on the ethos of liberal individualism, with its strong empha-
sis on freedom of choice and self-determination.107 This form of valida-
tion claims to free international law from its traditional reliance on the 
state as a necessary perquisite for the making of global norms. The con-
cept of individual consent plays a particularly central role in two fields of 
international law: international arbitration and Internet law. Yet, as with 
the other techniques, this concept yields deep and unresolved puzzles. 
Consider first the arbitration field. An increasing number of interna-
tional disputes are being adjudicated today in global arbitration cen-
ters.108 This trend can be attributed both to the legal regime, which was 
created by the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and to a general expansion in the 
number of international business transactions.109 The New York Conven-
                                                                                                             
(2007) (with respect to the vagueness of the precautionary principle); David G. Victor, 
Recovering Sustainable Development, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 91, 92 (2006) (noting with re-
spect to the vagueness of the sustainability paradigm that “UN summits . . . have yielded 
broad and incoherent documents and policies. Sustainable development, the compass that 
was designed to show the way to just and viable economics, now swings in all direc-
tions.”). 
 107. See Barry Schwartz, Self-determination: The Tyranny of Freedom, 55 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 79 (2000); Wendy Larner, Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality, 
63 STUD. POL. ECON. 5 (2000). 
 108. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical 
Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 537 (2005) (reporting an 
increase in the number of arbitration requests filed with the International Court of Arbi-
tration from 1999–2003). 
 109. Pedro Martinez-Fraga, The Convergence of Legal Cultures in Arbitration and 
Amendments to the New York Convention: If it is Not Broken, Why Fix it, but if it is 
Good, Make it Better, in JEAN MONNET/ROBERT SCHUMAN PAPER SERIES, at 1, 12 (Mi-
ami-Florida European Union Center No. 20, 2006). A similar increase has taken place in 
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tion ensures worldwide exclusive jurisdiction to arbitration proceedings 
based on valid arbitration agreements, provides procedures for the recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign awards, and limits the grounds on 
which domestic courts can refuse requests for enforcement to a few basic 
procedural defects.110 The New York Convention is not, therefore, just a 
mechanism of enforcement: through the principle of non-interference, it 
has facilitated the emergence of a new global law that is insulated from 
the influence of inter-state politics.111 The normative space that was cre-
ated by the New York Convention has been filled by a new a-national 
system of international commercial law, the new lex mercatoria,112 and a 
new institutional apparatus comprised of independent arbitrators and 
several permanent arbitral centers such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce International Court of Arbitration (“ICA”), the London Court 
of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), and the US International Centre 
for Dispute Resolution.113 But trying to unfold the normative status of 
this new nexus of norms and institutions reveals a deep puzzle. How can 
a system that is based on disaggregated and discontinuous contractual 
arrangements (arbitration clauses),114 also claim simultaneously a con-
tinuous and permanent legal presence? 
                                                                                                             
the field of investment arbitration. See Luke Eric Peterson, The Global Governance of 
Foreign Direct Investment: Madly Off in All Directions, No. 19, at 12–14, Occasional 
Papers, Dialogue Globalization (May 2005). 
 110. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Con-
vention].  
 111. As of March 12, 2007, the Convention had 142 parties. Updated data about the 
status of the Convention can be found on UNCITRAL’s Web site. See UNCITRAL, 
Status 1958–Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_ 
status.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2007). 
 112. Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J. 
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 627, 627–30 (2006); Peer Zumbansen, Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: 
Perspectives on Internal Affairs in Domestic and International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
197, 198 (2004). 
 113. See International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration; London Court of International Arbitration, 
http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/; American Arbitration Association, http://www.adr.org. 
For other International Arbitration Centers, see International Business—Arbitration Cen-
ters, http://www.constructionweblinks.com/Organizations/International__Organizations/ 
arbitration_centers.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2007). 
 114. The reliance on arbitration clauses is reflected both in the language of the New 
York Convention, which limits its jurisdiction to valid arbitral agreements, see New York 
Convention, supra note 110, art. II(3), and in the Web sites of the arbitral centers men-
tioned above, which provide their prospective clients with recommended arbitration 
clauses, see the Web sites of the ICA and LCIA, supra note 113. A typical arbitration 
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The ICA constitutes a particularly fascinating example of this existen-
tial paradox. The ICA Dispute Resolution Rules115 draw their validity 
from the parties’ consent.116 In contrast to conventional arbitration, the 
ICC Rules provide the ICA with the authority to scrutinize an award.117 
Under the ICC Rules, the arbitral tribunal is required to submit its award 
in draft form to the ICA. According to Article 27: 
Before signing any Award, the Arbitral Tribunal shall submit it in draft 
form to the Court. The Court may lay down modifications as to the 
form of the Award and, without affecting the Arbitral Tribunal’s liberty 
of decision, may also draw its attention to points of substance. No 
Award shall be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal until it has been ap-
proved by the Court as to its form.118 
Commentators note that in scrutinizing the award, the ICA focuses on 
issues such as the completeness of the award, its adherence to the ICC 
Rules and the governing national law, internal consistency, and whether 
it is sufficiently reasoned before authorizing its issuance to the parties.119 
Although the Court cannot compel the arbitrators to take account of its 
comments with respect to substance, arbitrators usually take notice of the 
Court’s comments, at least to some extent.120 The Court does not provide 
the parties with the reasons for its decision. It seems, then, that by giving 
their consent to ICC arbitration, parties give their agreement not only to 
adjudicate before an arbitrator according to the law of their choosing, but 
                                                                                                             
clause states: “All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall 
be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Com-
merce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules.” Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration, http://www.iccw 
bo.org/court/arbitration/id4114/index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2007). 
 115. International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration Dispute 
Resolution Rules, http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules_ 
arb_english.pdf. 
 116. Id. art. 6. 
 117. The ICA’s role is defined in Article 1 of the Rules, and in Appendices I and II 
thereof. Id. art. 1, apps I, II. According to Article 1(2), “The Court does not itself settle 
disputes. It has the function of ensuring the application of these Rules. It draws up its 
own Internal Rules.” Id. art. 1(2). 
 118. According to Appendix II, Article 6, “When the Court scrutinizes draft Awards in 
accordance with Article 27 of the Rules, it considers, to the extent practicable, the re-
quirements of mandatory law at the place of arbitration.” Id. app. II, art. 6. 
 119. Ellis Baker and Anthony Lavers, Review of Arbitrators’ Exercise of Power in 
English Law: The House of Lords Decides, 22 INT’L CONSTRUCTION L. REV. 493, 499–
500 (2005). 
 120. Id. 
30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:1 
also to the elusive and autonomous jurisprudence of the ICA.121 Thus, the 
ICA’s powers and the normative force of its jurisprudence rest, miracu-
lously, on the disaggregated and prospective contractual arrangements of 
its current and future “clients.” 
Internet law provides another example of the invocation of individual 
consent as an independent grounding. Two prominent examples are 
ICANN’s Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(“UDDRP”)122 and the World Wide Web Consortium Platform for Pri-
vacy Preferences Project (“P3P”).123 Similar to the world of arbitration, 
the force of ICANN’s dispute resolution policy and the P3P code stems 
from the direct consent of the concerned individuals⎯without the media-
tion of the state. In the case of ICANN’s dispute settlement policy, con-
sent is given in the contract signed between a domain-name holder and a 
registrar.124 In the case of P3P, the platform is incorporated into the ar-
chitecture of the browsers and the Web sites, and consent is implied from 
the purchase or usage of the browser.125 The global code is reinterpreted 
in these cases as a contract⎯a true manifestation of the idea of social 
contract.126 
                                                                                                             
 121. The London Court of International Arbitration has a somewhat similar dual archi-
tecture; the powers of the London Court are, however, more limited. See LCIA Arbitra-
tion Rules arts. 3, 29, http://www.lcia.org/ARB_folder/arb_english_main.htm. 
 122. See ICANN, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy [UDDRP], 
http://www.icann.org/udrp/. The policy is applicable across all generic top level domains 
(.aero, .biz, .cat, .com, .coop, .info, .jobs, .mobi, .museum, .name, .net, .org, .pro, .tel and 
.travel). The policy provides for obligatory international arbitration for disputes arising 
from alleged abusive registrations of domain names (for example, cybersquatting). The 
arbitration proceedings may be initiated by a holder of trademark rights. The UDDRP is a 
policy between a registrar and its customer and is included in registration agreements for 
all ICANN-accredited registrars. For a list of approved dispute-resolution service provid-
ers, see ICANN, Approved Providers, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-
providers.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007). 
 123. Platform for Privacy Preferences [P3P], http://www.w3.org/P3P/. The Platform 
for Privacy Preferences Project enables Web sites to express their privacy practices in a 
standard format that can be retrieved automatically and interpreted easily by user agents. 
P3P user agents allow users to be informed of site practices (in both machine- and hu-
man-readable formats) and to automate decision-making based on these practices when 
appropriate. Thus, users need not read the privacy policies at every site they visit. Id. 
 124. ICANN, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policies: Eligibility Re-
quirements Dispute Resolution Policy, para. 1, http://www.icann.org/udrp/erdrp-
policy.html. 
 125. In some cases, the browser is already installed on the computer when it is pur-
chased; consent is then indicated through the act of purchase. 
 126. For a general discussion of the social contract, see S.A. Lloyd, Hobbes’s Moral 
and Political Philosophy, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (E.N. Zalta ed., 
2007] PURITY LOST 31 
This new form of validity finds resonance in the ideas of individual in-
tegrity and individual empowerment that are central to contemporary 
Western culture. On close scrutiny, however, postulating individual con-
sent as a validating force seems highly problematic. In the case of arbi-
tration, the gap between the disaggregated and discontinuous contractual 
consent, the permanent nature of the lex mercatoria, and some of the new 
arbitral centers seems unbridgeable. In the case of the new global Inter-
net codes, the invocation of consent does not seem to cohere with the 
traditional understanding of consent in contract law: the image of “two 
autonomous wills coming together to express their autonomy by binding 
themselves reciprocally to a bargain of exchange.”127 Can one seriously 
speak about consent in the context of ICANN’s policy and the P3P code 
if the individual in question has not taken part in the negotiation of the 
code or contract in question, and in effect, has no choice but to accept it 
if he wants to register a domain name or enjoy some kind of privacy pro-
tection as he surfs the Net?128 
If one rejects individual consent as an acceptable form of validation, 
perhaps there is no choice but to look for alternative groundings. Thus, in 
the case of the lex mercatoria, can one appeal to universal principles of 
commercial law⎯a natural law of contracts? And, in the case of the 
UDDRP and the P3P standards, where validity may reside, not in the 
fictitious consent, but in the process through which they were devel-
oped⎯their invocation of notions such as democracy and procedural jus-
tice? 
The increasingly blurred normative reality that characterizes the con-
temporary international legal universe provides wide occasion for hori-
zontal conflicts between different forms of validation. The field of in-
vestment disputes provides a particularly interesting example of this po-
tential tension. There is a problematic interplay between forum selection 
clauses that are included in individual investment contracts and arbitra-
tion procedures set out in bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) inter-
preted in light of the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
                                                                                                             
2002), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/; Williamson M. Evers, Social Con-
tract: A Critique 1 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 185 (1977). 
 127. Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning 
of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2006). For further information on the prob-
lematic nature of contract formation in standard electronic contracts and the question of 
privacy protection, see Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum 
Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1045 (2005); Lisa M. 
Austin, Is Consent the Foundation of Fair Information Practices? Canada’s Experience 
Under PIPEDA, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 181, 191 (2006). 
 128. Recall that P3P is encoded in the architecture of both Web sites and browsers. 
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Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Conven-
tion”).129 The question raised in these conflicts is whether the forum se-
lection clause can be seen as a waiver of BIT jurisdiction. In other words, 
the question is whether the norm of the contract trumps the norm of the 
treaty or vice versa. There is a diversity of opinion on this question.130 
D. The Bundling of Law and Technology 
Another highly novel source of global validity is the bundling of law 
and technology. This new technique emerged as a side effect of the de-
velopment of digital technology that allows the bundling of software and 
norms in one digitized product.131 Such norm-in-the-machine products 
have been available in various forms for some time. One example is the 
domain of intellectual property rights (“IPR”). Instead of protecting IPR 
in a certain product (e.g., software or music) through the use of contrac-
tual terms or by relying on state regulation, IPR can be protected from 
violations with special software offering world-wide protection using 
various technological means.132 Such technology is increasingly being 
used in the fight against online file-sharing software.133 P3P provides 
                                                                                                             
 129. For the text of the ICSID Convention and details about the way it operates, see 
The World Bank Group ICSID Convention, Regulation and Rules, 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm. As of April 10, 2006, 143 coun-
tries have ratified the Convention. The World Bank Group ICSID Convention, Regula-
tion and Rules, Introduction, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/intro.htm (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2007). 
 130. See Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 (W. Bank) 1, 21–30 
(2005), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html (last visited Oct. 6, 
2007); SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. 
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ment Treaty Arbitration, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 653, 676–679 (2006). 
 131. Machines are understood as devices for accomplishing a task as a collection of 
functional components. See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Inte-
gration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1143 (2002). 
 132. A good example is MediaMax. MediaMax is a copy-prevention software pro-
duced by SunnComm Technologies that is designed to prevent unauthorized copying of 
audio CDs using personal computers. See MediaMax Technology, 
http://www.mediamaxtechnology.com/; John A. Halderman, Analysis of the MediaMax 
CD3 Copy-Prevention System, PRINCETON U. COMPUTER SCI. TECHNICAL REP. TR-679-03 
(2003). 
 133. See Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, New Weapon In Web War Over Piracy, N.Y. 
TIMES, FEB. 19, 2007, at C1. The new technological weapon in this case is based on con-
tent-recognition software, which makes it possible to identify copyrighted material and to 
block it (unless it was licensed for use on the site). One of the key players in this field is 
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another example. The P3P standard is integrated into software (browser) 
and into the structure of Web sites (another type of machine).134 Another 
example is new filtering software that is used to protect minors from ex-
posure to sexually explicit materials on the Web.135 In this case, as in the 
case of intellectual property rights, the software proclaims to fulfill a task 
that was previously reserved to state regulation. What is common to all 
these cases is the invocation of technology as a new type of (global) 
grund norm.136 
In Ashcroft v. ACLU,137 the U.S. Supreme Court reached a similar con-
clusion when it noted that filtering software might more effectively pro-
tect minors from exposure to sexually explicit materials on the Internet 
than the Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”).138 This led the Court to 
the conclusion that COPA was unconstitutional (by violating the First 
Amendment) because of the availability of less restrictive alternatives.139 
The importance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in terms of this 
Article’s thesis regarding the fragmentation of the concept of validity lies 
                                                                                                             
Audible Magic. See Audible Magic, http://www.audiblemagic.com/ (last visited Oct. 6, 
2007). 
 134. On the structure of P3P technology, see Daniel J. Weitzner et al., Creating a Pol-
icy-Aware Web: Discretionary, Rule-based Access for the World Wide Web, in WEB AND 
INFORMATION SECURITY 1, 6 (Elena Ferrari & Bhavani M. Thuraisingham eds., IRM Press 
2006), available at http://www.w3.org/2004/09/Policy-Aware-Web-acl.pdf. See also 
LORRIE CRANOR ET AL., THE PLATFORM FOR PRIVACY PREFERENCES 1.1 (P3P1.1) 
SPECIFICATION § 1.1.2 (2006), http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P11/. 
 135. For a discussion of blocking and filtering products, see Richard W. Boss, Meeting 
CIPA Requirements with Technology, Am. Lib. Ass’n Technotes (Oct. 11, 2007), 
http://www.pla.org/ala/pla/plapubs/technotes/internetfiltering.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 
2007). 
 136. For further discussion of this phenomenon, see Radin, supra note 127; Margaret 
Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. INST. & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 1 (2004). 
 137. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
 138. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998). 
 139. Filtering software was seen as less restrictive because filters impose 
selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at 
the source. Under a filtering regime, childless adults may gain access to speech 
they have a right to see without having to identify themselves or provide their 
credit card information. Even adults with children may obtain access to the 
same speech on the same terms simply by turning off the filter on their home 
computers. Further, promoting filter use does not condemn as criminal any 
category of speech, and so the potential chilling effect is eliminated, or at least 
much diminished. 
Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 667. 
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not in the particulars of American free speech doctrine, but in its de facto 
recognition of technology as a source of private law.140 
But the claim that technology acts as a new form of normative ground-
ing seems to confuse the is and the ought⎯leaping from efficacy to nor-
mativity.141 This problematic has not escaped legal observers of modern 
technology. Thus, for example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(“EFF”) brought legal action against Sony BMG based on its distribution 
of CDs that incorporated an IPR protection software.142 One of the claims 
raised by EFF alleged that many consumers were not aware that the CDs 
they bought included this software and that it was downloaded to their 
computers without their consent.143 Once again, we see a conflict be-
tween two forms of validation: technology and individual consent.144 
IV. TAKING A STEP BACK: HAVE WE EVER BEEN PURE? 
A. Purity Revisited 
The structure of contemporary international law is clearly incompatible 
with the pure Westphalian conception of international law. Deeper re-
flection, however, exposes the purity of the Westphalian order as a ficti-
tious construct, whose claim for coherence and completeness does not 
stand up to scrutiny, even if we limit its domain of applicability to the 
(distant) past. The impurity of the Westphalian scheme of validity be-
comes apparent almost immediately when considered from the perspec-
                                                                                                             
 140. One can see a similar process taking place in the field of morality. See Bruno 
Latour & Couze Venn, Morality and Technology: The End of the Means, 19 THEOR. 
CULT. SOC. 247, 253–54 (2002). 
 141. This leap characterizes the concept of legal validity in general. See Csaba Varga, 
Validity, 41 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 155 (2000). See also infra Section IV.B. 
 142. For other cases dealing with this problem, see, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. 
Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (2005); DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 
2004). 
 143. Complaint ¶¶ 96–97, Hull v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment Corp., 2005 WL 
3806321 (Nov. 21, 2005) (No. BC 343385). In response to the filing of the suit by the 
EFF, SunnComm has undertaken a commitment to ensure that future versions of Media-
Max will not install when the user declines the end user license agreement (“EULA”) that 
appears when a CD is first inserted in a computer CD or DVD drive. SunnComm has also 
agreed to include uninstallers in all versions of MediaMax software, to submit all future 
versions to an independent security-testing firm for review, and to release to the public 
the results of the independent security testing. Electronic Frontier Foundation, CD Copy 
Protection Firm Promises Fix for Software Problems (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www.eff. 
org/news/archives/2006_02.php#004378. For the full litigation history, see Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, Sony BMG Litigation Info, http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony- 
BMG/#docs (last visited Oct. 18, 2007). 
 144. Radin, supra note 127, at 1231. 
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tive of simple logic. State will cannot be considered the ultimate source 
of international law because it leaves unanswered the question of the 
normative force of the rule that says that will binds. Thus, the force of 
the norm pacta sunt servada must be assumed to derive⎯if we want to 
avoid circularity⎯from a source that is independent of the will of 
states.145 This has already been noted by various scholars of international 
law. For example, Hersch Lauterpacht, in a book published in 1927, 
notes: 
To say that the binding force of treaties is derived from the will of con-
tracting parties who, through an act of self-limitation, give up a part of 
their sovereignty, is to leave unanswered the query why the treaty con-
tinues to be binding after the will of one party has undergone a change. 
The will of the parties can never be the ultimate source of the binding 
force of a contract whose continued validity is necessarily grounded in 
a higher objective rule . . . it is the objective validity, independent of 
the will of States, of the rule pacta sunt servanda which renders legally 
possible the working of conventional international law.146 
The attempt to resolve the question of the force of pacta sunt servanda 
through appeal to a higher customary law faces similar difficulties. At 
the level of customary international law, we have to cope with the paral-
lel question of the source and status of the norms regulating the making 
of customary international law. If the idea of customary international law 
regulating itself does not seem satisfactory, we have no choice but to 
imagine a higher level-law⎯an imaginary constitutional global 
law⎯that will be the source of such norms.147 
But the impurity of the Westphalian model does not lie just in its lack 
of grounding. It is also reflected in the way in which the idea of state 
consent opens up the possibility of a legal universe comprised of parallel, 
equal-standing, legal regimes that are not subject to any superstructure of 
higher-level law.148 This is not mere theoretical conjecture: presidents of 
                                                                                                             
 145. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1870–1960 364 (Cambridge University Press 2002). 
 146. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
(CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY) 56–57 (The Law Book Ex-
change 2002) (1927) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT 1927]. See also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, 
THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 416–20 (Oxford Clarendon 
Press 1933) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT 1933]. 
 147. For the dual hierarchy approach, see Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary 
International Law, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 662, 665 (1953). For a critique, see Kammerhofer, 
supra note 4, at 539–40. 
 148. See Kammerhofer, supra note 4, at 549. 
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the ICJ have warned on several occasions of the risks posed by fragmen-
tation and over-lapping jurisdictions, and one of them noted that “the 
proliferation of international courts may jeopardize the unity of interna-
tional law and, as a consequence, its role in inter-State relations.”149 
The search for alternative sources of validity is not new. A prominent 
example is the appeal to morality as an independent source of interna-
tional law. This modern phenomenon represents, so it seems, a return to 
the tradition of natural law that dates back to Hugo Grotius (1583–1645). 
The natural law tradition received renewed attention in the early 20th cen-
tury, appearing in the academic writings of several legal scholars in a 
counter-reaction to the rise of legal positivism. Thus, in 1927 Hersch 
Lauterpacht, in Private Law Sources and Analogies of International 
Law: with Special Reference to International Arbitration, wrote about a 
renaissance of natural law.150 He refers to several modern reconstructions 
of this tradition, invoking concepts such as “the sense of right” and “so-
cial solidarity.” Particularly illuminating is a quote from Frederick Pol-
lock: “We must either admit that modern international law is a law 
founded on cosmopolitan principles of reason, a true living offshoot of 
the Law of Nature, or ignore our most authoritative expositions of it.”151 
Lauterpacht further developed this thesis in his article, The Grotian Tra-
dition in International Law.152 For Lauterpacht, the force of the Grotian 
tradition stemmed from the intrinsic insufficiency of the “conception of 
international law as derived from state will” and from the “constant need 
. . . [to] judg[e] its adequacy in the light of ethics and reason.”153 It 
                                                                                                             
 149. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President, ICJ, Address to the U.N.G.A. (Oct. 30, 
2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=82&p1=6&p2=1& 
search=%22%2230+October+2001%22%22. See also Guillaume Speech 2000, supra 
note 1; Schwebel Speech 1999, supra note 1. On the issue of fragmentation, see Martti 
Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxie-
ties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 553–56 (2002). 
 150. LAUGHTERPACHT 1927, supra note 146, at 58. 
 151. Id. at 58–59, n.7 (quoting Frederick Pollack). 
 152. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 1, 21–24 (1946). Another important figure in the revival of the Grotian tradition 
was Cornelius van Vollenhoven, especially in his Three Stages in the Evolution of Inter-
national Law (1919). See Renee Jeffery, Hersch Lauterpacht, the Realist Challenge and 
the ‘Grotian Tradition’ in 20th-Century International Relations, 12 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 
223, 224 (2006). 
 153. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2, at 408. Lauterpacht argues that “the acceptance of 
the law of nature as an independent source of international law” is one of the precepts of 
modern international law. Lauterpacht, supra note 152, at 51. For further information, see 
C. Wilfred Jenks, Hersch Lauterpacht: the Scholar as Prophet, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 
72 (1960); Jeffery, supra note 152, at 237–41. 
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seems, then, that international law has never been pure. Nor is the search 
for alternative groundings a new phenomenon. 
B. The Problem of Grounding in Law and the Truth-Teller Paradox 
The problem of grounding is a measure of the deep indeterminacy that 
is part and parcel of the concept of law in both its municipal and interna-
tional realizations. The question of grounding does not afflict only the 
Westphalian scheme of consent⎯it is common to all the forms of valid-
ity considered above. Whenever a new source of validity is invoked as an 
alternative to the Westphalian paradigm, the question of its own justifica-
tion remains in a mist of arbitrary articulations. In considering this prob-
lematic, it is interesting to consider a similar puzzle that arises in the 
field of semantics—the Truth-Teller Paradox. Consider the following 
sentence: 
K1 This sentence is true. 
We can use the structure of this sentence to produce a truth-telling se-
quence (with each sentence belonging to the domain of its predecessor): 
The next sentence is true. 
The next sentence is true. 
The next sentence is true. 
. . . (ad infinitum).154 
Initially, one may take these truth-telling sentences as unproblematic. 
Indeed, these sentences do not generate the kind of semantic instability 
that characterizes liar-like sentences. However, upon reflection, this con-
clusion seems hasty. In this case (as with the liar-like statements), the 
sentences involved can consistently be assigned conflicting true/false 
values. This makes them hopelessly undetermined.155 The distinction 
between the Liar Paradox and the Truth-Teller Paradox is that in the 
former, “the problem is that there is no consistent assignment of truth-
values,” while in the latter, “the problem is that there are too many con-
sistent assignments;” thus, any “assignment must involve an arbitrary 
choice as to which truth-value should be assigned.” 156 
                                                                                                             
 154. This example is taken from Hans G. Herzberger, Paradoxes of Grounding in Se-
mantics, 67 J. PHIL. 145, 150 (1970). See also Roy Sorensen, Future Law: Prepunishment 
and the Causal Theory of Verdicts, 40 NOUS 166, 176 (2006). 
 155. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge, Dialetheism, Semantic Pathol-
ogy, and the Open Pair, 84 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL, 395, 397–399 (2006). 
 156. ROY SORENSEN, VAGUENESS AND CONTRADICTION 167 (Oxford University Press 
2002). See also Herzberger, supra note 21, at 150. 
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The notion of validity in law produces something akin to the Truth-
Teller Paradox. Validity is the qualifying mark or label of legal norms.157 
It distinguishes between the law (rules) in force and that which is not 
law. In other words: “Law which is not valid is not law.”158 Thus, deter-
mining the validity of norms is of critical importance; it is essential to the 
formation of normative expectations and is also a critical component of 
legal decision-making. It is the validity of the law that makes its norma-
tive statements binding. While non-legal prescriptive statements also 
purport to be binding, they invoke other reasons for their bindingness.159 
But validity is not only a mark unique to law; it can only be endowed and 
transferred according to law. The concept of validity thus holds an inevi-
table circularity: validity can only be determined recursively, that is, by 
reference to valid law.160 Because norms cannot be evaluated through the 
logical prism of truth and falsity, the concept of validity operates as a 
plausible alternative.161 Consider, for example, the following set of rules 
(“the Paradox of Validity”): 
Rule 1.1: This rule, and all the rules enumerated below, are valid. 
Rule 2.1: . . . 
Rule 2.2: . . . 
Rule 2.3: . . . 
. . . 
                                                                                                             
 157. Varga, supra note 141, at 155. 
 158. LUHMANN, supra note 27, at 125. 
 159. See Vranas, supra note 35, § 3 (discussing the notion of bindingness). 
 160. LUHMANN, supra note 27, at 128; Varga, supra note 141, at 155–56. 
 161. Vladimir Svoboda, Forms of Norms and Validity, 80 PONZAN STUD. PHIL. SCI. 
AND HUMAN. 223, 229 (2003). As in classical logic, I assume bivalence, i.e., a binary 
distinction between valid/not-valid. While validity resembles in some aspects the notion 
of truth, it does not generate the same kind of paradoxes. Thus, for example, the notion of 
validity does not yield a paradox parallel to the Liar Paradox. As an example, imagine 
that you open the Civil Code that is in force in your country. On page 100 of the Code, 
you find rule number 499, which states: 
499. This rule is not valid. 
What is the meaning of this sentence? Consider, first, the option that rule 499 is valid—
that is, it represents the law in force. If it is valid, then what it says is valid as well, and 
since it says about itself that it is not valid, this must be valid as well. This is a contradic-
tion. Assume, alternatively, that rule 499 is not valid. Then what it says about itself is 
indeed the case, and no contradiction arises (strictly speaking, if a rule is not valid, what 
it says is legally irrelevant). Unlike the Liar Paradox, there is a simple way out: we as-
sume that rule 499 is not valid. This leaves us with the riddle of how and why this sen-
tence was incorporated into the Code in the first place. 
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Rule 2.n: . . . (ad infinitum). 
This sequence of rules can have two consistent assignments (at least) 
of validity values. The first, in which both the Rule 1.1 (“meta rule”) and 
all the other rules (“secondary rules”) are valid, and the second, in which 
both the meta rule and all the secondary rules are invalid.162 The Truth-
Teller Paradox generates a similar problem of multiple (consistent) as-
signments of truth and falsity. 
Note, however, that there are important differences between the Para-
dox of Validity and the Truth-Teller Paradox. In the latter, it is possible 
to argue that the sentences included in the Truth-Teller sequence are 
vacuous or under specified; this reflects the fact that these sentences do 
not supply concrete conditions by which their truth or falsity may be de-
termined. They fail to yield a statement.163 The parallel legal sequence is 
not vacuous. Even if we consider it invalid, its deontic content is not lost. 
The normative statements simply lose the color of law; they become non-
legal norms. 
The foregoing paradox reflects one of the deepest dilemmas of modern 
law: on one hand, we feel uncomfortable with the thought that law vali-
dates itself; on the other hand, this is exactly what is expected from the 
law according to the modern conception of validity⎯that is, that validity 
can only be endowed according to law. The assumption that the criteria 
and authority for determining the validity of norms must be instituted 
through valid law thus generates a vicious circularity, which seems to be 
logically irresolvable. 
At this point, it might make sense to turn to philosophy. Perhaps we 
can gain some inspiration from the various strategies invoked by phi-
losophers to resolve the puzzle of semantical paradoxes. Let me briefly 
sketch some of the attempts to resolve these paradoxes.164 
Alfred Tarski proposed to resolve the puzzle of the Liar Paradox by re-
placing our everyday, singular understanding of truth with a multi-level 
                                                                                                             
 162. The qualification “at least” is necessary because once we assume that the meta 
rule is not valid, there can be multiple assignments of validity that attribute different val-
ues to the secondary rules. 
 163. Transforming K1 into a bi-conditional yields the following vacuous sentence: K1 
is true if and only if K1 is true. In contrast, in proper statements such transformation 
makes perfect sense. Consider: K2 Leaves are green. The sentence “K2 is true if and only 
leaves are green” is fully specified. See Laurence Goldstein, Fibonacci, Yablo, and the 
Cassationist Approach to Paradox, 115 MIND 867, 884–85 (2006). 
 164. See generally, SAINSBURY, supra note 13; RESCHER, supra note 12. An important 
solution strategy that I will not discuss is based on rejecting (some) of the assumptions of 
classical logic (e.g., the law of excluded middle). See, e.g., Graham Priest, What Is So 
Bad About Contradictions, 95 J. PHIL. 410 (1998). 
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linguistic framework.165 According to this construction, one is able to 
speak meaningfully about the truth of statements in one language (the 
object language) only in a language that is located higher on the linguis-
tic hierarchy than the object language and whose expressive capacities 
are essentially richer (the meta language).166 
Another approach views the non-hierarchical character of natural lan-
guage as a given. It proposes to resolve the riddle of the Liar and Truth-
Teller Paradoxes by arguing that groundless sentences are intrinsically 
ill-formed and should be excluded from the realm of state-
ments⎯statement being understood as a sentence that is “used to say 
something true or false.”167 It is argued that groundless sentences, while 
grammatically correct, fail to make any statement; they are, in other 
words, truth incompetent. Furthermore, since these sentences are truth 
incompetent, it makes no sense to ask whether they are true or false.168 
Laurence Goldstein argues that the reason why liar-like sentences gen-
erate such awe and confusion is not because of any deep logical prob-
lematic, but rather because of certain deep-seated beliefs and preconcep-
tions that characterize human thought. Underlying the semantical para-
doxes is our naive intuition that “the paradoxical sentences, because they 
are not ungrammatical, vague or sortally suspect and encompass no false 
presuppositions, must yield statements when used.”169 The analysis of 
these paradoxes thus seems to belong more to the realm of psychology 
than to the realm of logic. 
In effect, the foregoing approaches introduce, though for different rea-
sons, a general ban on self-reference and other forms of groundlessness. 
However, this ban may seem too strict for and incongruent with our in-
tuitions regarding the use of language. An alternative approach is offered 
by the model of naive semantics, articulated by Hans Herzberger. The 
essence of this approach is the following: 
In naive semantics, paradoxes are allowed to arise freely and to work 
their own way out. No semantic defences are to be set up against them. 
. . . No effort will be made to eliminate the paradoxes, to suppress 
                                                                                                             
 165. Alfred Tarski, The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Seman-
tics, 3 PHIL. PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 341, 350–51 (1944). 
 166. Id. at 349–52. 
 167. Statement, following Goldstein, is understood as “a truth-bearer, a used sen-
tence—‘used’ not in the sense just of being uttered out loud (a pheme) or written down (a 
grapheme) but in the sense of being used to say something true or false.” Laurence Gold-
stein, A Unified Solution to Some Paradoxes, 100 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 53, 54 
(1999) (emphasis in original). 
 168. Id. at 58. 
 169. Id. at 69. 
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them, or in any way to interfere and take deliberate action against them. 
They are to unfold according to their own inner principles. In its early 
stages naive semantics may appear somewhat haphazard and even cha-
otic. Gradually some islands of stability will emerge and grow until 
eventually everything has resettled into a new but orderly arrange-
ment.170 
Instead of trying to break or suppress the semantic instability associ-
ated with semantical paradoxes⎯their oscillation between truth and fal-
sity⎯naive semantics calls us to embrace it. This can be achieved by 
exposing the pattern through which paradoxical statements change their 
values at different stages of evaluation.171 Naive semantics thus rejects 
any attempt to classify liar-like sentences as neither true nor false or both 
true and false. Their “fundamental semantic character is neither a truth 
value nor the absence of a truth value, but a valuational pattern” that has 
certain regularities.172 By demonstrating that paradoxical sentences fol-
low certain regularities, naive semantics shows “how a language could 
contain paradoxical statements and nevertheless have a systematic and 
coherent semantic structure.”173 
What are the implications of the philosophical struggle with semantical 
paradoxes for the study of the paradox of validity? Consider Tarski’s 
hierarchical conception of truth.174 To apply Tarski’s proposal to law, 
one would have to assume a hierarchy of laws in which the validity of 
the lower-level normative layer could only be determined through the 
prism of a higher law. This hierarchical conceptualization of validity is 
inconsistent, however, with our practical experience of law as a unitary 
system. So maybe, following the philosophical strategy of barring 
                                                                                                             
 170. Herzberger, supra note 21, at 482. 
 171. This valuation technique consists of two phases: 
Each statement undergoes two phases of evaluation, either of which can be 
trivially simple or, within fixed bounds, extremely complicated. Each statement 
can be assigned two characteristic ordinal numbers: a stabilization point and a 
fundamental periodicity. The stabilization point for a statement marks the earli-
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Id. at 492 (emphasis in original). Thus, for example, the Looped Liar discussed above, 
supra note 19 and accompanying text, is cyclic with periodicity 4. Starting with the as-
sumption that Plato’s statement is true leads to the conclusion that Socrates’ statement is 
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 172. Id. at 497 (emphasis added). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Tarski, supra note 165, at 349–52. 
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groundless sentences, we should impose a ban on groundless normative 
structures? This solution raises many difficulties: first, because the idea 
that validity should only be endowed according to law has deep roots in 
the moral and political culture of the Western world, and second, because 
it is not clear what constitutes a proper grounding for a global norm. 
The answer to the question of legal paradoxicality lies elsewhere, and 
requires, as will be argued below, a conceptual switch. This alternative 
approach has some resonance with the dynamic vision of naive seman-
tics. 
C. The Praxis of Paradox: From Purity to System Dynamics 
Exploring the puzzle of legal paradoxes requires a departure from the 
philosophical and logical approach to the study of paradoxes. The phi-
losophical inquiry has been guided by the idea that paradoxes represent a 
certain malady of thought that should somehow be eliminated, prevented, 
or resolved.175 One of the main tasks of logic is to free us from this dis-
ease.176 
The philosophical approach is not applicable to law because the notion 
of paradox⎯in its philosophical and logical connotations⎯does not ap-
ply to law in its social instantiation.177 This has to do with the fact that 
paradoxes are properties of sentences.178 Because law, as a social system, 
is not reducible to sentences (e.g., norms), it cannot be, strictly speaking, 
paradoxical⎯although it can be depicted as self-referential, self-
                                                                                                             
 175. Thus, Alfred Tarski has noted in one of his papers: “The appearance of an antin-
omy is for me a symptom of disease.” Alfred Tarski, Truth and Proof, 220 SCI. AM. 63, 
66 (1969). 
 176. Nicholas Rescher observes: “The prime directive of rationality is to restore con-
sistency in such situations.” RESCHER, supra note 12, at 9. See also Chihara, supra note 
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 178. Goldstein, supra note 167, at 54. I use the term “sentence” to denote a string of 
words satisfying the grammatical rules of a language. See WordNet 2.0 dictionary, 
http://wordnet.princeton.edu (follow “search” hyperlink and search for “sentence”). This 
broad definition includes sentences in the form of both statements and norms. Statements 
(or claims), unlike norms, are truth-bearers; they can be true or false. 
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organizing, or self-producing.179 The paradoxes of law emerge as senten-
tial reflections of its unique systemic structure⎯of its self-organizing 
and self-producing features. A self-organizing system is a system that not 
only regulates or adapts its behaviour, but creates its own organization. 
Self-production (or autopoiesis) denotes the process by which a system 
recursively produces its own network of components (in the case of law, 
communication ordered by the distinction legal/illegal), thus continu-
ously regenerating its essential organization in the face of external per-
turbations and internal erosion.180 Self-organizing and self-producing 
systems are intrinsically circular and self-referential.181 
Recognizing that the paradoxes of law are reflections of its unique sys-
temic structure indicates that the notion of purity does not provide a suit-
able guide for the study of legal paradoxicality.182 One cannot purify the 
                                                                                                             
 179. One of the key lessons of the social analysis of law is the understanding that the 
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 181. In mathematical terms, these forms of circularity can be modeled by an equation 
representing how some phenomenon or variable y is mapped onto itself by a transforma-
tion or process f: y = f(y). To make sense of this equation, one needs to explicate what y 
and f stand for. For a more detailed analysis, see Heylighen & Joslyn, supra note 180, at 
160. 
 182. The notion of purification is invoked, for example, by Nicholas Rescher. 
RESCHER, supra note 12, at 31. Rescher himself provides some support for the foregoing 
thesis in his distinction between the practical and theoretical contexts. In practical con-
texts, Rescher argues, “there is a possibility of compromise—of affecting a division that 
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11. 
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law from its paradoxes because they reflect vital steering and stabilizing 
mechanisms without which the law would not be able to counteract ex-
ternal pressures.183 The static perspective, which characterises the study 
of paradoxes in logic, is not suited for that task because it is not sensitive 
to the social dynamic underlying the paradoxes of law.184 The circular 
quality of the concept of validity is therefore an inevitable feature of le-
gal communication. This circularity does not undermine the normative 
unity of the legal system because the mark of validity is taken for granted 
in the recursive operations of the law.185 Further, in functional terms, this 
circularity provides the law with far-reaching flexibility by empowering 
it to create and destruct normative structures in response to conflicting 
social pressures. 
V. THE POLYMORPHOSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS 
REPERCUSSIONS 
The groundlessness of law is not, then, a new problem. Still, I will ar-
gue that the paradoxicality of the contemporary system of international 
law constitutes a novel phenomenon. What is unique in the structure of 
the international legal system is not the impurity of our forms of valida-
tion, but the emergence of multiple validating techniques, which are in-
voked simultaneously at the forefront of the international legal body. The 
global legal system has moved from a state of (imaginary) purity to a 
state of multiple paradoxicalities⎯a process of polymorphosis⎯leading 
to a much more complex juridical universe.186 But what are the social 
implications of this process? In order to answer this question, let me first 
                                                                                                             
 183. It is simply wrong, therefore, to view consistency, as Fletcher does, “as an over-
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999, 1000–01 (2004). 
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outline the key types of deep inconsistencies that afflict the contempo-
rary universe of international law. 
1) Horizontal inconsistent sources of validation. 
There is no universally agreed upon concept of 
validity. Different international regimes use dif-
ferent notions of validity (compare the WTO re-
gime to the ICA).187 In some cases, this form of 
inconsistency leads to transregime conflicts 
(e.g., the clash between treaty and contractual 
obligations in the investment domain and the 
clash between consent and technology in Inter-
net law).188 
2) Internal inconsistency. Within the same legal re-
gime, it is possible to find conflicting concep-
tions of validity pulling in different directions 
(e.g., the cases of the WTO and the ICC).189 
3) The incorporation of vague sources of validity 
(from morality to science). Vagueness yields 
conflicting interpretations both within particular 
regimes and across regimes (e.g., the new prin-
ciple of civilian inviolability and the precaution-
ary principle).190 
Together, these inconsistencies bring forth a legal universe whose 
complexity is multidimensional. The complexity of modern international 
law cannot be captured through reference to the heterogeneous, institu-
tional reality of multiple legal tribunals. Its complexity runs deeper, cov-
ering many layers of legal praxis and challenging the traditional bounda-
ries and tenets of international law (such as the distinction between pub-
lic and private international law). But what are the possible repercussions 
of the polymorphosis process? In the following Sections, I explore this 
question by considering the influence of the polymorphosis process on 
the structure and autonomy of the global legal system, on its stability, its 
relationship with other systems of governance, and on its external legiti-
macy. Responding to these questions requires us to move from the realm 
of historic-analytic analysis into the realm of futuristic socio-legal analy-
sis. This move also makes the following discussion much more explor-
ative (even speculative). 
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 188. See supra Section III.B. 
 189. See supra Section II.B. 
 190. See supra Section III.B. 
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A. From Colonization to Internal Complexification: The Emergence of 
Cosmopolitan Law 
The polymorphosis process can be postulated to be a consequence of 
the colonization or instrumentalization of the global legal system by mul-
tifarious external systems.191 There are certainly voices that argue that 
this colonization is widespread, with a finger pointed, in particular, to the 
global economic system or the so-called “Washington Consensus.”192 
Economic rationality and economic institutions (in all their different em-
bodiments, public and private), it is argued, are actually calling the shots; 
the law⎯from the WTO to the Climate Change Convention⎯operates as 
a mere façade for economic calculations and corporate interests.193 While 
this argument has some merit, I do not find it convincing as an explana-
tion for the diverse processes depicted above. 
There are two main reasons for my skepticism. First, the diversity and 
complexity of the different validation techniques⎯reflecting both their 
horizontal incompatibilities and their internal fuzziness⎯makes this ar-
gument unconvincing. The empirical argument that served to reject 
Kunz’s purity thesis by questioning its coherence likewise serves to re-
ject this totalistic Marxist critique (by similarly questioning its coher-
ence). Second, the search for grounding, which underlies all of the forms 
of validation discussed in Section III, reflects a common adherence to the 
                                                                                                             
 191. On the risk of the colonization of global law by external sources see, for example, 
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concept of normativity. Indeed, the quest for validity can only make 
sense within the realm of law.194 
The polymorphosis process represents, therefore, something else: an 
internally generated process of complexification. It is a purely internal 
phenomenon⎯an internally driven reconstruction of law’s groundings 
with the law reacting, but not yielding, to external sources.195 The appeal 
to democracy, science, morality, direct consent, and technology does not 
signal the colonization of law, but rather an extension of the horizon of 
possibilities through which international law, in its various realizations, 
can react to external pressures. But the polymorphosis process represents 
a deeper message. It brings forth a new kind of global law⎯a truly cos-
mopolitan phenomenon. The unity of this new body of global laws does 
not derive from the ideal of national sovereignty or from some projected 
global hierarchy;196 rather, it is constituted through a common appeal to 
the concepts of normativity and grounding, which are postulated as uni-
versally applicable distinctions. 
B. Paradox, Diversity, and Resilience 
The polymorphosis process does not seem to reflect, then, the subjuga-
tion of the law by external forces. However, the impact of this process on 
the functional operation of the law and on its relationship with other so-
cial systems still constitutes an unresolved problematic. This problematic 
raises two questions: first, could the multiple forms of self-reference and 
inconsistencies associated with the polymorphosis process lead to ir-
resolvable conflicts within and between regimes, leading ultimately to 
the total paralysis of the global legal system?197 Second, and in light of 
this possibility, could the entanglement of the law in its internal para-
doxes lead to the expansion of other social systems (economics, politics, 
morality, and religion), simultaneously causing global law to contract as 
problems migrate to other systems? 
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Systems theory recognizes operational paralysis and structural disinte-
gration as a possible trajectory in the life of ecological and social sys-
tems.198 However, this conjecture is not the most plausible account of the 
future direction of the contemporary global legal system. I argue that the 
complexity and diversity of the contemporary body of law, with its pro-
liferation of validation techniques, should be seen, at this point, as a 
source of strength rather than weakness. This complexity contributes to 
the resilience of the global legal system and enhances its ability to re-
spond to external pressures. The legal anxiety associated with the possi-
bility of regime collisions and normative contradictions199 confuses the 
micro level (the ramifications of a local dispute, e.g., between the WTO 
regime and the Kyoto Protocol) and the macro level—the resilience of 
the global legal system in its totality. 
This argument draws on the study of the relation between system resil-
ience and diversity in ecology. The concept of resilience is used in ecol-
ogy to denote the width or limit of a stability domain in an ecological 
system and is defined by the “magnitude of disturbance that a system can 
absorb before it changes stable states.”200 Biodiversity is defined as a 
measure of two features of an ecological system: functional-group diver-
sity and functional-response diversity.201 Functional-group diversity 
measures the diversity of the ecosystem in terms of groups of species that 
fulfill different functions (e.g., species may pollinate, graze, predate, fix 
nitrogen, etc.).202 The persistence of functional groups contributes to the 
performance of ecosystems and the services that they generate, while the 
loss of a major functional group, such as apex predators, may cause dras-
tic alterations in ecosystem functioning.203 Functional-response diversity 
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is defined in terms of the diversity of responses to environmental change 
among species that contribute to the same ecosystem function.204 Vari-
ability in response to environmental change within the same functional 
group is critical to ecosystem resilience.205 
There is an increasing consensus among ecologists that biodiversity 
contributes to system resilience by increasing sources of renewal and 
reorganization, and by providing a rich response horizon.206 Generally, 
biodiversity provides cross-scale resilience. Species combine to form an 
overlapping set of reinforcing influences, spreading risks and benefits 
widely, and thus retaining overall consistency in performance, independ-
ent of wide fluctuations in the individual species.207 
Using biological concepts in the study of social processes is not a triv-
ial exercise. The following comments constitute a first step in an explora-
tion of the applicability of the idea of ecosystem resilience to the study of 
social systems.208 In the context of law, resilience may be understood in 
terms of the capacity of the legal system to withstand external coloniza-
tion attempts (reflecting a shift from autonomy to allonomy)209 or its ca-
pacity to maintain a certain level of communicative activity (with differ-
ent levels representing different states). The diversity of validation tech-
niques constitutes a form of functional-response diversity. It provides the 
law with multiple avenues to respond to external pressures, maintaining, 
nonetheless, its normative unity (against competing social orders).210 
This diversity—which in the legal domain is translated into paradoxi-
cal tensions at the meta-normative level—has advantages at both the mi-
cro-regime level and the macro-meta-system level. Let me give a few 
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concrete examples. In the case of the WTO, the friction between the 
autonomy of the legal system and its apparent commitment to the West-
phalian paradigm allows the law to proceed with its internally driven 
conceptual innovation while still relying on the legitimacy produced by 
the ideal of state consent.211 The reference to external validating 
sources⎯such as science and environmental ethics⎯further enriches the 
response horizon of WTO law. In the case of the lex mercatoria, the ten-
sion between disaggregated contractual sources and a permanent institu-
tional and doctrinal apparatus allows the law to develop deep sensitivities 
to the needs of the global economic system within a stable institutional 
infrastructure, providing the system with memory and coherence (despite 
its fragmented foundations). The reliance on (and development of) uni-
versal private law doctrines that operate as a common conceptual grid 
constitutes an additional source of validity and stability. At the meta-
regime level, the interplay between the different validation sources al-
lows the legal system to respond to multiple social needs despite political 
and economic constraints. Thus, for example, the GRI, drawing upon an 
innovative institutional structure based on a tripartite commitment to 
consensus-building, inclusive decision-making process, and the vision of 
sustainable development, has successfully initiated a new global scheme 
dealing with corporate sustainable reporting in a field in which the con-
ventional treaty-making route would have faced formidable obstacles.212 
The lesson from the biological discussion of diversity and resilience 
seems to be clear: there is value in diversity in both its institutional and 
normative dimensions. In terms of institutional design, this suggests, I 
will argue, a shift from models of institutional hierarchy and normative 
unity to reflexive models that maintain this diversity and the paradoxical 
frictions associated with it.213 I will say more about that in Section VI. 
C. The Implications for the Legitimacy of the Global Legal System 
Finally, a key question is to what extent the paradoxes of validity in-
fluence the (external) legitimacy of international law. This question re-
quires us to distinguish between moral and sociological understandings 
of legitimacy. Legitimacy, in the moral, normative sense, refers to the 
right to rule.214 Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane argue that in the 
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case of global institutions, the right to rule should be understood to mean 
“both that institutional agents are morally justified in making rules and 
attempting to secure compliance with them and that people subject to 
those rules have moral, content-independent reasons to follow them 
and/or to not interfere with others’ compliance with them.”215 Legiti-
macy, in a sociological sense, is a measure of belief. From a sociological 
perspective, an institution is legitimate when it is widely believed to have 
the right to rule.216 Legitimacy is therefore a subjective quality, defined 
by the perception of the institution in the eyes of the individual.217 
There is a sharp distinction between sociological and normative per-
spectives. From a sociological perspective, making a claim about the le-
gitimacy of certain global institutions should not be seen as a “moral 
claim about the universal legitimacy, or even less the moral worth, of any 
particular international rule.”218 This understanding of the sociological 
aspect of legitimacy provides, however, only part of the picture because 
it focuses exclusively on the individual perspective.219 One can also take 
a systemic-institutional view of legitimacy. This perspective conceptual-
izes legitimacy as a measure of the capacity of the law to maintain its 
autonomy and as a measure of the growth or contraction of legal com-
munication. 
In exploring the relation between legitimacy and validity, I want to fo-
cus on one concrete question: what are the implications of the autological 
and increasingly heterogeneous character of the concept of validity for 
the legitimacy of global law? I will start with the moral aspect of legiti-
macy and will then consider the sociological aspect. Initially, one can 
take the view that the validity of the law is irrelevant to the question of 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is a moral measure, which is determined by 
moral considerations; as such, it should not be influenced by internal le-
gal constructions. However, as Buchanan and Keohane demonstrate, the 
moral legitimacy of international legal institutions is also a function of 
the operational dynamic of the legal system.220 To the extent that the 
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various paradoxes of validity influence this dynamic, they can also influ-
ence the legitimacy of the law. 
Buchanan and Keohane make a two-fold argument in this context. 
They argue first that legitimacy is primarily an instrumental measure. 
The basic reason for states or other addressees of institutional rules to 
take them as binding and for individuals generally to support or at least 
to not interfere with the operation of these institutions is that they pro-
vide benefits that cannot otherwise be obtained. If an institution cannot 
effectively perform the functions invoked to justify its existence, then 
this insufficiency undermines its claim to the right to rule.221 
Second, Buchanan and Keohane suggest that part of the legitimacy of 
global governance institutions lies in certain epistemic-deliberative quali-
ties. In particular, they argue that to be legitimate, a global governance 
institution must create the conditions for ongoing critical contestation of 
its goals and terms of accountability through interaction with agents and 
organizations outside the institution.222 Achieving such epistemic respon-
siveness requires that the institution be both transparent and open to dia-
logue with external epistemic actors.223 
The question, then, is in what way does the autological and increas-
ingly heterogeneous quality of the concept of validity influence these two 
measures of legitimacy? If one adopts the view that the unfolding inco-
herence of the international legal system could lead to operational pa-
ralysis, one could conclude this will ultimately reduce the legitimacy of 
the international legal system. If, on the other hand, one adopts the view 
that this heterogeneity contributes to the resilience of the global legal 
system and to its capacity to cope with the range of problems facing the 
global society (as I have argued above), then it is reasonable to assume 
that this heterogeneity should contribute to the legitimacy of the interna-
tional legal body. 
The paradoxes of validity could also enhance the legitimacy of interna-
tional institutions by contributing to their epistemic responsiveness. The 
autological character of the transnational legal system turns it into a 
highly innovative system. It is, in the words of Heinz von Foerster, a 
non-trivial machine.224 Non-trivial machines⎯unlike trivial machines 
such as cars and mobile phones⎯are highly disobedient and unpredict-
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able.225 In non-trivial machines, “a response once observed for a given 
stimulus may not be the same for the same stimulus given later.”226 The 
autological nature of the law allows it to continuously challenge its tradi-
tional doctrines, analogies, and conceptual constructs. The broad ensem-
ble of validating techniques that characterize the global legal system fur-
ther enrich this self-reflection process. One of the main virtues of this 
self-referential dynamic is that it provides some guarantee against domi-
nation and exclusion. By creating an opening for a change, it provides 
room and hope for critical voices. In a world that cherishes diversity of 
life forms, this competency constitutes an important virtue.227 The deep 
heterogeneity of the global legal system seems to cohere better with the 
cultural diversity of global society. 
The sociological connection between legitimacy and validity consti-
tutes a difficult question. From a systemic perspective, I have argued that 
the paradoxes of validity may contribute to the resilience of the law and, 
in that sense, may also contribute to its legitimacy (understood as a 
measure of legal autonomy and the intensity of legal communication). 
Decoding the influence of paradoxes of validity on individual percep-
tions of legitimacy provides a difficult psychological puzzle. First, be-
cause of the low visibility of the paradoxes of validity, it is uncertain to 
what extent they affect the perception of global law within the wider 
public. If people are not aware of the incoherence and autological charac-
ter of the law, this fact will not affect their normative beliefs. Second, 
these features may influence subjective beliefs in different ways. Inco-
herence, for example may cause a loss of legitimacy by portraying law as 
a field in which decisions are made in a chaotic and arbitrary fashion. 
The self-referential nature of validity may put in doubt the bindingness 
of law⎯its capacity to provide content-independent reasons for action. 
Law has developed, however, doctrinal mechanisms that can cope with 
these questions (e.g., the use of vague concepts).228 
The cognitive reaction to legal paradoxes is still an under-explored 
question. So let me conclude this discussion by looking at the findings of 
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a recent article, which explored the cognitive repercussions of the similar 
Truth-Teller Paradox. Shira Elqayam explored the way reasoners evalu-
ate Truth-Teller-type propositions (“I am telling the truth”) and Liar-type 
propositions (‘‘I am lying’’).229 She found, through two experiments, the 
existence of a “collapse illusion” by which reasoners evaluate Truth-
Teller-type propositions as if they were simply true, whereas Liar-type 
propositions tended to be evaluated as neither true nor false.230 This psy-
chological result is inconsistent with the philosophical view of Truth-
Teller-type propositions, which considers them hopelessly indetermi-
nate.231 Elqayam offers several psychological explanations for this phe-
nomenon, which I cannot consider in detail here.232 However, it would be 
interesting to explore whether a similar phenomenon exists also in the 
case of validity. 
VI. FROM GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM TO CONTEXTUAL REFLEXIVITY 
Modern international law is impure, messy, and complex. But the at-
tempts to purify it through appeals to grand theories⎯constitutional, 
moral, or other⎯are ill-conceived.233 First, they fail to recognize the in-
nate paradoxicality of law, and second, they constitute a threat to the le-
gitimacy and resilience of the global legal system. The study of diversity 
and resilience in the ecological domain demonstrates the systemic value 
of diversity. In terms of institutional design, it suggests a shift from uni-
fying models based on hierarchical normative and institutional structures 
to reflexive models that could enhance and support the diversity of the 
global legal system. Indeed, as the concepts of normativity and rule of 
law become entrenched in the communicative fabric of global society, 
there is more room for experimenting with novel and reflexive institu-
tional structures. 
I would like to conclude this Article with two examples of highly re-
flexive legal structures. Underlying both examples is the idea of distrib-
uted authority. Such refined authority configurations provide richer op-
portunities for internal dialogue, self-contestation, and conceptual inno-
vation. The price, though, is some loss of coherence. The two examples 
demonstrate how the use of a reflexive structure can affect both the mi-
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cro-dynamic of a single regime, and the interplay between several re-
gimes. These examples also differ in their model of distributed authority 
and in the construction of their reflexive dynamic. 
My first example focuses on the GRI. The GRI was founded in 1997 
by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies in partner-
ship with the United Nations Environment Programme.234 The GRI is 
based on three potentially conflicting pillars: first, a commitment to 
multi-stakeholder decision making; second, an ideological commitment 
to the ethos of sustainable development; and third, a formal, hierarchical 
institutional structure.235 The commitment to consensual decision-making 
is reflected, for example, in the text of the G3 Sustainability Guidelines 
(2006): 
Transparency about the sustainability of organizational activities is of 
interest to a diverse range of stakeholders, including business, labor, 
non-governmental organizations, investors, accountancy, and others. 
This is why GRI has relied on the collaboration of a large network of 
experts from all of these stakeholder groups in consensus-seeking con-
sultations. These consultations, together with practical experience, have 
continuously improved the Reporting Framework since GRI’s founding 
in 1997. This multi-stakeholder approach to learning has given the Re-
porting Framework the widespread credibility it enjoys with a range of 
stakeholder groups.236 
The commitment to the value of sustainable development is set out in 
the G3 Guidelines. The Guidelines open with the famous definition of 
sustainability provided in the World Commission on Environment and 
Development report, Our Common Future.237 In addition to its commit-
ments to multi-stakeholder consultation and sustainable development, the 
GRI is also based on a carefully designed hierarchical structure. The GRI 
is run by a Board of Directors and a Secretariat.238 The Board has “the 
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ultimate fiduciary, financial, and legal responsibility for the GRI, includ-
ing final decision making authority on GRI Guidelines revisions, organ-
izational strategy, and work plans.”239 The Secretariat is responsible for 
implementing “the technical work plan set by the Board of Directors.”240 
While the Stakeholder Council is supposed to provide a kind of parlia-
mentary scrutiny with respect to the Board’s decision-making process, its 
formal powers are very limited.241 The Board has the formal capacity to 
adopt policies that are inconsistent with the results of the deliberation 
process and the ideological commitment to sustainable development.242 
The tripartite normative commitment of the GRI could potentially lead 
to a range of irresolvable conflicts. Despite this potential for internal 
quarrels, the GRI has functioned in an admirable fashion over the last 
years. It has produced two Reporting Guidelines over a period of four 
years.243 These Guidelines have not only reflected a deep commitment to 
ecological values⎯setting ambitious reporting standards that depart from 
the conventional, economic-oriented accounting principles⎯but have 
also influenced, in a substantive way, the reporting practices of MNEs.244 
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The GRI reflexive structure seems to have provided the organization 
with both innovative capacity and the legitimacy to carry out its mission. 
Further, it succeeded in a domain in which progress through the treaty-
making route would have been much more difficult. 
My second example is based on the vision of judicial dialogue, draw-
ing on the mechanism of preliminary ruling which was developed in the 
European Union. This mechanism can be used both in the context of sin-
gle regimes and in the context of cross-regime relationships. Under Arti-
cle 234 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,245 the 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) “may give preliminary rulings inter-
preting European law at the request of any national court.”246 This 
mechanism was initially intended to address only questions relating to 
the validity of European law.247 However, “the ECJ successfully encour-
aged national courts to use the mechanism to review the compatibility of 
national law with European law.”248 As a result of the preliminary refer-
ence mechanism, there have been fewer occasions on which the ECJ has 
exercised its authority to review national judicial decisions. Instead, the 
ECJ’s interaction with national courts has become something akin to ju-
dicial dialogue, with reciprocal learning and exchange of ideas.249 
The European model can serve as a template for creating more exten-
sive dialogue between international tribunals and national courts and 
possibly also between different international tribunals. The two regimes 
that were discussed in Section II⎯the WTO and the ICC⎯provide only 
limited opportunities for such dialogue. In the ICC Treaty, the principle 
that the Court is to be complementary to national criminal proceedings 
could be seen as a possible platform for this kind of judicial dialogue. 
The Rome Statute provides that the ICC will not exercise its jurisdiction 
if the state is genuinely willing to carry out the investigation or prosecu-
tion of crimes.250 The Statute also outlines processes for judicial review 
of national court decisions.251 Formally, the determination as to whether 
the domestic court proceedings were independent and impartial lies 
solely with the ICC itself; however, such intervention in domestic legal 
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proceedings is likely to prove highly controversial, and we can thus ex-
pect the Court to be careful in using this authority.252 It seems that incor-
porating some form of preliminary ruling procedure into the ICC Treaty 
could provide more room for judicial dialogue, while at the same time 
defusing some of the political tension associated with the judicial review 
procedure. Likewise, the WTO does not have procedures to facilitate a 
constructive dialogue between national courts and the WTO judicial tri-
bunals (although national courts play an important role in enforcing sec-
tions of the WTO rule book, especially in the fields of anti-dumping, in-
tellectual property rights, and government procurement).253 In both cases, 
and in particular that of the WTO, designing procedures that facilitate an 
equal-footed dialogue between national and international courts could 
contribute to the reflexivity and legitimacy of the legal system as a 
whole.254 
The conceptual shift from purity to reflexivity asks us then to embrace 
the paradoxicality of law. The polymorphosis process seems to mark the 
end of the dream of grand global constitutionalism. 
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